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10.1 Conditions Leading to the Debacle
The cost of the failures of thrifts (savings and loan associations and savings
banks previously insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpo-
ration [FSLIC]) in the 1980s and 1990s, and probably beyond, is enormous.
Present-value estimates range from $150 billion to $300 billion. Some of this
cost will be borne directly by owners of thrifts and banks in the form of higher
deposit insurance premiums to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC).
1 Some will be borne by the customers of these insured depositories,
depending on their elasticities of demand for deposits and bank loans. The
bulk of the cost probably will be paid by U.S. taxpayers.
The initial cause of the debacle should be well known. Prior to 1982, most
thrifts invested primarily in long-term fixed-interest mortgages that were
funded by deposits and other liabilities with much shorter durations. Conse-
quently, thrifts faced considerable interest rate risk. When interest rates in-
creased sharply in 1979-81 to a peak of about 15 percent on long-term U.S.
Treasury obligations and over 18 percent for thirty-year mortgages, the pres-
ent value of their assets declined much more than the present value of their
short-term liabilities, and a large number of thrifts became economically in-
solvent. The number of insolvent thrifts and the extent of their insolvency is
not known with much precision because thrifts and most other enterprises do
not record unrealized capital gains and losses. Carron (1982, 19) estimates
that the savings and loan industry had an aggregate economic (market value)
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negative net worth of $17.5 billion at year-end 1980 and negative $44.1 bil-
lion on 30 June 1981. Kane (1985, table 4.6) estimates that, by year-end
1982, some two-thirds of the nation's thrifts were economically insolvent,
with aggregate negative net worth of perhaps $109 billion.
2 Some 85 percent
of all institutions were unprofitable in accounting terms in 1982.
Relatively few economically insolvent thrifts were liquidated or merged by
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) through 1984. From 1981
through 1984, 180 thrifts were officially announced as having failed. An ad-
ditional 295 are identified by FHLBB economists as having been forced to
merge by the FHLBB to avoid failure (a total of 475). But, as many as 71
other thrifts had negative net worth according to regulatory accounting prin-
ciples (RAP). With net worth measured according to generally accepted ac-
counting principles (GAAP), as many as 434 operating thrifts had negative
net worth.
3 Annual numbers are given in table 10.1, as measured by econo-
mists at the FHLBB and at the General Accounting Office (GAO). Although
none of these metrics measure economic insolvency, the numbers indicate that
the FHLBB permitted many probably insolvent thrifts to continue operations.
Furthermore, the FHLBB reduced the legal net worth (RAP) requirement
over the period. RAP was adopted to increase the measure of net worth. In
1979 the FHLBB permitted thrifts to take up to 250 basis points of fees on
loans into income (and, hence, into net worth), even though GAAP requires
taking fees into income over the life of the institution's ownership of the loans,
with the exception of fees that reimburse currently charged expenses. In 1981
the FHLBB permitted thrifts to defer losses on the sale of assets with below -
market yields over the lives of the loans sold rather than reduce net worth
immediately. Also in 1981 the FHLBB permitted capital-deficient thrifts to
issue qualifying mutual capital certificates and income capital certificates that
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the FHLBB reduced the net worth requirement from 5 to 4 percent of liabili-
ties and, in January 1982, the net worth requirement was reduced to 3 percent.
In July 1982, liability accounts, such as loans in process, unearned discounts,
and deferred fees and credits, were reclassified as contra-assets, which re-
duced liabilities and increased the ratio of RAP net worth to liabilities. In that
same month the FHLBB approved an accounting change that allowed good-
will from an acquisition (including goodwill resulting from an exchange of
stock rather than only from a purchase) to be expensed over forty years, while
gains from the write-up to market of assets acquired would be taken into in-
come (and, hence, into net worth) over a five- to ten-year period. In November
1982, in an effort to prevent sale and lease backs of thrifts' fixed assets, the
FHLBB permitted the use of appraised equity capital to increase regulatory
net worth.
4 The net effect of these and other differences increased RAP over
GAAP by 17, 16, and 20 percent on average in 1982, 1983, and 1984.
5 The
results of these regulatory changes and accounting gimmicks are reflected in
the considerably greater number of GAAP-insolvent compared to RAP-
insolvent thrifts presented in table 10.1.
Congress sought to alleviate the deposit outflow with the Depository Insti-
tutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), enacted on 31
March 1980. To permit chartered depository institutions to compete with un-
regulated alternative investments, particularly money market mutual funds
(MMMFs) and brokers' cash management accounts, Regulation Q ceilings on
time and savings deposits were phased out over a six-year period and deposit
insurance coverage was raised from $40,000 to $100,000 per account. These
changes had the effect of shifting risk, as well as risk-monitoring, away from
thrift depositors and to the FHLBB and FSLIC.
DIDMCA also permitted federally chartered thrifts to diversify their assets
somewhat by allowing them to invest up to 20 percent of their assets in a
combination of nonresidential real estate, commercial and consumer loans,
commercial paper, and corporate debt securities. They also were permitted to
invest up to 3 percent of assets in service corporations, as long as one-half of
the investment over 1 percent of assets was devoted to community or inner-
city developments. Ceilings on the amounts that could be loaned on mort-
gages and geographical restrictions on loans were removed. Nationwide lend-
ing was permitted by the FHLBB in 1983.
Further liberalization was permitted by the Garn-St Germain Depository
Institutions Act, enacted on 15 October 1982. The deregulation of deposit
interest rates was hastened by permitting institutions to offer interest-bearing
checking (NOW) accounts and money market deposit accounts that were
competitive with MMMFs. The act authorized thrifts to make commercial real
estate loans up to 40 percent of assets, make consumer loans up to 30 percent
of assets, make commercial and agricultural loans up to 10 percent of assets,
invest in personal property for rent or sale up to 10 percent of assets, and
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assets. Until Garn-St Germain, federal charters could be obtained only for
mutual associations; the act permitted federal stock charters and allowed the
conversion of mutuals to stockholder ownership.
Several states permitted the thrifts they chartered more extensive asset pow-
ers. The permissible limits varied considerably. Equity securities could not be
held by thrifts in thirty states. Fourteen of these also prohibited thrifts from
having an equity interest in non-business-premise real estate.
6 The states ex-
periencing substantial numbers of failures are of special interest. In 1980,
Florida was first to allow its thrifts to invest 20 percent of their assets in ser-
vice corporations and 10 percent in real estate. In 1982, Texas permitted
thrifts to invest up to 10 percent of assets in service corporations and amounts
up to their equity in real estate. California eliminated all real estate asset re-
strictions in 1983 (subject to specific supervision by state authorities). Ari-
zona allowed its thrifts to invest 10 percent of assets in real estate and equity
securities and 6 percent in service corporations. Among states with relatively
few failures, Nebraska and Wisconsin imposed no dollar limitations on direct
investments in real estate.
As the 1980s progressed, it became increasingly clear that the number and
cost of thrift failures was far greater than the officially recognized figures, and
that the decline in interest rates by 1984 to levels somewhat above the pre-
1978 level but much below the prior peak would not "bail out" the sickest
institutions. The number of official and internally recognized failures was 70
in 1985. The chairman of the FHLBB, Edwin Gray, strongly (and almost
single-mindedly) urged thrifts to make adjustable-rate mortgages, which were
federally authorized in April 1981, as the primary means of reducing their
exposure to interest rate risk. He concentrated on three sources of what he
believed was excessive risk-taking by thrifts: brokered deposits, direct invest-
ments, and growth. In January 1984 the FHLBB and the FDIC jointly an-
nounced a proposed regulation that, if enacted, would have virtually denied
deposit insurance to depositors who used the services of brokers to place their
funds. The regulation was not enforced because it was found to be illegal by
the Federal District Court (District of Columbia) in June 1984, a decision
upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
January 1985. In March 1985 the FHLBB limited direct investments by state-
chartered FSLIC-insured thrifts to the lower of 10 percent of assets or twice
RAP-measured equity without the prior approval of the FHLBB. In June
1987, direct investments were further limited, and land loans and nonresiden-
tial construction were subjected to limitations.
7 In March 1985, the growth of
savings and loan associations was limited by a regulation imposing higher
capital requirements on institutions that increased their total liabilities by
more than 15 percent a year, measured quarterly. In addition, growth at an
annual rate of 25 percent of liabilities was prohibited without prior approval
by the FHLBB.309 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
10.2 Hypotheses on the Causes of the Debacle
Several, somewhat overlapping, hypotheses have been suggested and as-
serted to explain the factors responsible for the thrift debacle. Each is dis-
cussed briefly.
8 Because none of the explanations appears sufficient to explain
the collapse of the industry, we later model them operationally and subject
them to empirical test.
1. Unbalanced Durations of Assets and Liabilities—Interest-Rate Risk
Thrifts generally have made and held long-term fixed-interest mortgages
funded with liabilities that are repriced at much shorter intervals, and thus are
subject to interest-rate risk. Before the Great Depression, savings and loan
associations (S&Ls) financed their mortgage holdings with share capital that,
allegedly, could not be readily withdrawn. As Barth and Regalia (1988, 117)
point out, "it was not until the advent of federal deposit insurance for savings
and loan associations in the 1930s that the taking of deposits as such became
widespread." Furthermore, because the average maturity of their mortgage
holdings was about eleven years, the durations of the two sides of their bal-
ance sheets were probably not as greatly mismatched, nor were they subjected
to the amount of interest-rate volatility recently experienced (Benston and
Kaufman 1990).
In the subsequent years, the duration of mortgages increased, following the
lead of FHA-insured mortgages. FSLIC insurance guaranteed the par value of
the shares (initially up to $5,000 per shareholder), effectively transforming
S&L shares into deposits with short durations. This mismatch strategy works
well as long as the yield curve is positively sloped. The duration "bomb" did
not go off before 1979-81 because previous interest rate increases were insuf-
ficient to use up the economic capital S&Ls had amassed as a result of favor-
able tax treatment and restraints on entry into their markets.
As we stated earlier, the sharp increase in rates in 1979-81 caused eco-
nomic insolvencies amounting to perhaps $100 billion. The actual amount is
not well established. The published estimates may be overstated because thrift
managers and owners and the FHLBB expected interest rates to decline. If
this were the situation, the expected cash flows from mortgages and other
fixed-interest obligations should be discounted by the interest rates expected
rather than by the rates recorded for mortgages made in 1981, 1982, and so
forth. These "actual" rates include the value of the mortgagors' option to refi-
nance when interest rates decline.
2. Excessive Risk-Taking by Economically Insolvent and Weak Thrifts
Economic theory (or even simple common sense) suggests that the owners
and managers of economically, though not regulatorily, insolvent institutions
have very great incentives to take very high risks promising large returns310 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
(which they retain) and large losses (which the FSLIC and other uninsured
creditors, if any, absorb). The effect of the FHLBB's permitting insolvent in-
stitutions to continue operations has not been well established. As discussed
below, most of the research uses data from thrifts with stock traded on ex-
changes. While such data are preferable to accounting numbers, the observa-
tions exclude most thrifts and may include biases endemic to these thrifts.
Other research uses traditional accounting data, from which RAP, GAAP, and
TAP (tangible accounting principles)
9 net worth is derived. None of these
measures reports the economic market value of a thrift. Consequently, we de-
voted a large part of our eflFort to measuring the market value of thrifts' assets
and liabilities to determine the market value of their net worths. We use these
market-value data to test the hypothesis that losses in post interest-rate-
increase periods were a function of the economic value of thrifts rather than
deregulation and other factors.
3. Overspecialization in Mortgage Loans—Insufficient Diversification and
Declines in Economic Conditions
Tradition, government subsidies, and regulatory constraints have caused
thrifts to concentrate on home mortgages and other real estate lending and
investing. Prior to the Great Depression, most S&Ls (at that time called build-
ing and loans) were societal organizations established to help their members
buy homes. They tended to be small: the average S&L had only $750,000 in
assets. Their rate of failure during the Great Depression reflected their spe-
cialization and size. Of the 11,777 S&Ls operating in 1930, 526 failed (4.5
percent). These failed associations held $410.6 million of the industries'
$8,828.6 million total assets (4.7 percent) and had an average asset size of
$781,000 (Benston and Kaufman 1990). This failure rate exceeded that of the
now similar mutual savings banks (MSBs). Only eight (1.3 percent) MSBs
failed during the Great Depression, in large part because they held much more
diversified portfolios: 55 percent of their assets were mortgages, 14 percent
government obligations, and 22 percent in other securities (Welfling 1968,
73-74). However, S&Ls did much better than commercial banks, which ex-
perienced a 38.5 percent drop in numbers, from 24,970 in 1929 to 15,348 in
1934. The S&Ls' better experience appears due to the close relationship of
shareholders (there were no depositors) and mortgagors, which provided
strong incentives and opportunities for monitoring loans.
1
0
Legislation enacted during and following the Great Depression, particu-
larly deposit insurance and favorable tax treatment tied to home mortgage
investments, allowed and encouraged specialization by S&Ls in mortgages
and real-estate-related consumer loans. Until 1983, S&Ls could write mort-
gages only within 100 miles of their offices or within their state. Although the
Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 authorized S&Ls to invest up to 10 percent of
its assets in commercial loans and 100 percent in state or local government311 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
securities, it permitted them to branch only if they met the Internal Revenue
Code's qualified thrift lender (QTL) test. To be a QTL, a thrift had to hold 60
percent of its assets in home mortgages, mortgage-backed securities, cash,
student and passbook loans, or certain government securities. The QTL
threshold was changed to a more restrictive 70 percent in 1989 by the Finan-
cial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).
1
1
As a result of specialization in real estate loans concentrated geographi-
cally, thrifts tended to be vulnerable to local economic depressions. This con-
centration may account for the large number and cost of failures in such states
as Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Colorado, which were particularly hard
hit by the collapse of petroleum prices in the 1980s.
1
2 Local overbuilding and
overoptimistic pricing followed by a collapse of real estate prices in such
states as Arizona and perhaps Massachusetts similarly may account for thrift
failures. However, it should be noted that not all thrifts failed in these areas,




An additional factor contributing to thrift losses is the 1986 change in the
income tax statute which disallowed fast write-offs of commercial real estate.
This reduced the expected net cash flows from new and purchased commercial
real estate investments and projects, rendering negative the present values of
many of these ventures. The owners then had incentives to default on their
mortgage obligations.
4. Deposit Insurance and the Removal of Interest-Rate Ceilings on Savings
Deposits
Federal deposit insurance, instituted in 1934 with the establishment of the
FSLIC, relieved most depositors in thrifts from concern about the risks taken
by those institutions. The increase in 1980 from $40,000 to $100,000 per
account, together with lower computing costs that permitted investors to di-
vide large sums efficiently into many thrift and bank accounts and the "too-
large-to-fail doctrine," is thought to have resulted in de facto 100 percent de-
posit insurance for savings placed with insured depositories. Consequently,
when ceilings on savings deposits (including certificates of deposit, or CDs)
were removed beginning in April 1980 and accelerated in December 1982,
thrifts could attract funds from outside their market areas through the services
of brokers or directly from their own efforts.
Kane (1985, 1989), among others, emphasizes the moral hazard costs of
deposit insurance as the primary cause of the thrift (and bank) losses. He
points out that severely unbalanced duration portfolios would not be feasible
if depositors (and, consequently, depository institutions) had to bear the cost
of interest-rate risk.
14 The federal deposit insurance agencies do not charge a
direct risk-related premium, which gives thrift owners and managers incen-
tives to take on high-risk projects promising high returns but negative ex-312 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
pected present values. However, the insurance agencies can impose indirect
risk-related costs on thrifts in the form of intrusive examinations and strict
supervision.
1
5 If it is measured in terms of economic market values, capital
also can serve as a means of imposing deductible or coinsurance. The effec-
tiveness of these means of reducing moral hazard is examined below.
5. Deregulation of Asset Investments and Brokered Deposits
Deregulation of asset investments exacerbated by growth made possible by
brokered deposits appears to be the most often charged cause of the thrift
disaster, at least among legislators, regulators, the thrifts' principal trade as-
sociation (the United States League of Savings Institutions), and the press.
The former chairman of the FHLBB, Edwin Gray, was particularly concerned
about direct investments and brokered deposits. His concern resulted in regu-
lations enacted in 1985 and extended in 1987, limiting the amount of such
investments by insured thrifts.
1
6 As noted above, he unsuccessfully tried to
eliminate brokered deposits, but he was able to put on growth restrictions in
1985. Mr. Gray's belief was echoed by the United States League of Savings
Institutions (Strunk and Case 1988). It also is reflected in the provisions of
FIRREA. Thrifts' investments in commercial real estate loans now are re-
stricted to four times capital rather than the Garn-St Germain limit of 40
percent of assets. The powers of state-chartered savings and loan associations
are restricted generally to those permitted federally chartered associations,
and investments in real estate equity and non-investment-grade (junk) bonds
by all thrifts must generally be phased out by mid 1994. The legislation also
restricts troubled institutions from accepting brokered deposits. As mentioned
above, the act further emphasizes residential mortgages by increasing the
QTL test to 70 percent from 60 percent of assets. In large measure then, FIR-
REA has re-regulated the thrift industry to its position before the Garn-St
Germain Act of 1982 with respect to asset powers.
1
7
Evidence in support of the FIRREA asset and brokered deposits restrictions
has not been published, to our knowledge. As summarized later, some studies
report findings that are inconsistent with the assumptions underlying re-
regulation. Additional evidence on the relationship between the assets re-
stricted by FIRREA and the insolvency of thrifts is presented below.
6. Risk Aversion and Risk Preference of Mutual Compared to Stock Thrifts
Prior to enactment of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of
1982, only state-chartered S&Ls could issue equity claims. Encouraged by
the Reagan administration, the act permitted federally chartered S&Ls and
mutual savings banks to convert to stock ownership. Both the ownership sta-
tus and the conversion itself may have affected the propensity of thrifts to take
risks that, on average, led to considerable losses.
Economic theory provides reason to expect managers of mutual institutions
to be more risk-averse than owners and managers of stockholder-owned insti-313 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
tutions. Managers of mutuals in effect are the owners of those institutions,
subject to the constraint that they can be removed by the supervisory authori-
ties and are subject to control by a board of directors whom they essentially
appoint but may not control completely. Importantly, mutual managers cannot
directly garner large gains from successful operations, because they do not
own stock that can be sold to realize those gains. Instead, their rewards come
in the form of higher salaries and perquisites, the magnitudes of which are
restricted by the supervisory authorities. Furthermore, they cannot transfer
the wealth embodied in the positions to their heirs or others, except indirectly
by providing jobs for favored persons and arranging for their positions to be
"inherited" by their sons or daughters. All of these constraints and limitations
should lead them to be risk-averse, as their income and wealth is concentrated
in their job positions and can continue only so long as their associations are,
at a minimum, allowed to stay open.
The managers who are not owners of stock thrifts are in a similar situation.
Should their decisions turn out badly, they are likely to lose their jobs. Should
these decisions turn out well, they will reap rewards, but these are not likely
to be symmetrical with their expected costs. Hence, they should tend to be
risk-averse, unless they are controlled effectively by the owners of their firms,
cet. par.
In the absence of punitive supervision, owners of thrifts should tend to pre-
fer risk, which increases inversely with the firm's capital cushion, given the
presence of deposit insurance that is not priced to reflect completely the cost
of risk, cet. par. Their preference for risk, though, may be restrained by the
diversification they can achieve in their personal portfolios. As is the situation
for the managers of mutuals, a very large portion of some owners' wealth may
be firm-specific. Given decreasing marginal utility of wealth, these owners
may not perceive benefits from greater risk-taking.
7. Fraud, Self-Dealing, Incompetence, and Inadequate Supervision
Allegations of fraud and self-dealing by managers and owners of failed
thrifts abound. Several books and newspaper exposes have been published
describing how the "bad guys" looted specific thrifts.
1
8 There seems to be little
doubt that such illegal behavior occurred. Although FIRREA provided funds
to enhance the Department of Justice's prosecution of miscreants, the extent
to which wrongdoers will be successfully prosecuted and the stolen or misap-
plied resources recovered is in doubt. The extent to which the losses incurred
are due to the illegal behavior also is not known and may never be known.
Incompetence of thrift managers also is alleged as an important cause of
losses. This hypothesis is related to the issues of specialization and deregula-
tion. Before high and variable interest rates characterized the market, thrift
management did not require sophisticated financial knowledge. But unsettled
conditions and the new asset and activity powers granted to thrifts in the early
1980s required considerable financial expertise. As a result, thrift managers314 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
may have invested poorly because of inexperience rather than dishonesty.
(This hypothesis leads to predictions about losses that are contrary to the pre-
diction expected from the risk-aversion hypotheses previously discussed.)
Another explanation of why poor performance occurred in the 1980s to a
greater extent than in earlier periods (assuming that such is the case) is a
breakdown of effective examination and/or supervision. The possibility of
fraud and self-dealing always is present in depository institutions. Indeed,
earlier investigations found fraud and mismanagement to be the principal
cause of bank and thrift failures.
1
9 A major purpose of field examinations is
(or should be) to uncover and discourage such problems, and a major function
of supervision is to use examiners' reports and other sources of information to
stop and mitigate these problems. Institutions with negative or low economic
capital should be closely monitored and supervised, as their managers and
owners have considerable incentives to "steal or bet the bank." Evidence on
the effectiveness of the FHLBB in these regards, and the effect of managerial
incentives and deregulation on examination and supervision is considered
below.
10.3 Previous Evidence on Failures and FSLIC Losses
10.3.1 Causes of Failures and Insolvencies
Benston (1985) and Barth, Brumbaugh, Sauerhaft, and Wang (1985)
Benston matched each of the 202 thrifts that officially failed between 1 Jan-
uary 1980 and 31 August 1985 with four nonfailures, two just larger and two
just smaller, in each of five regions. Various balance sheet ratios of these
thrifts were compared for each year. Barth, Brumbaugh, Sauerhaft, and Wang
(hereafter BBSW) similarly analyzed 318 official and unofficial (unannounced
FSLIC-assisted mergers) failures in 1982 and 1983. Benston also analyzed
separately failed and nonfailed thrifts in California, Texas, Florida, Ohio, and
Louisiana; the findings are similar to those reported for the total sample. Both
studies used accounting rather than market values.
Benston found that negative (book value) net worth in the year prior to
failure was not a necessary condition for failure. However, compared to their
nonfailed peers, the failed thrifts' net worth to total asset ratios are signifi-
cantly lower in each year prior to failure. The failed thrifts' return on total
assets also are significantly lower than their peers' by an average of 2.2 per-
centage points, due primarily to lower net interest margins. (BBSW report
similar results.) The lower margins are the result of higher cost of funds, ap-
parently arising from significantly greater reliance on jumbo CDs, Federal
Home Loan Bank advances, and brokered deposits. Yields on earning assets
are not significantly different, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis that
the failed thrifts took greater risks than their nonfailed peers, assuming that315 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
the accounting numbers reflect correctly the economic values of the thrifts'
assets, liabilities, and expected loan losses.
Foreclosed mortgages to total loans in the Benston study is significantly
greater for the failed thrifts in both studies. Nonresidential mortgages to total
loans also is significantly greater, although this variable exhibits considerable
variance among institutions (BBSW do not use this variable). Both studies
find that nontraditional assets (nonmortgage commercial and consumer loans,
and direct investments) are unrelated to failures. Perhaps surprisingly, growth
in assets at the failed and nonfailed thrifts is not much different for Benston's
data (BBSW do not report this variable).
The relationship of the financial ratios and other variables to failure also
was analyzed by Benston and BBSW with a multinomial logit model. Benston
and BBSW find significant inverse relationships between failure and net worth
to total assets and return on total assets. With net worth to total assets ex-
cluded, significant inverse relationships to failure were found for the yield on
earnings assets and for state rather than federal charter, and significant posi-
tive relationships for the change in the cost of funds and change in total assets
(BBSW did not use these variables). Among the variables not related to fail-
ure, even at the 0.10 level, are large liabilities (CDs over $1 million plus
Federal Home Loan Bank advances and other debt) to earnings assets, depos-
its to earnings assets, and direct investments to total assets. BBSW report a
similar finding for direct investments.
Benston additionally analyzed the financial statements of the twenty-one
failures that held direct investment of more than 5 percent of total assets. The
reasons for their failures appeared to be quite diverse. High growth was found
at only 52 percent of the thrifts, 43 percent experienced high interest expenses
relative to revenue, 24 percent recorded large non-operating expenses, and 43
percent incurred large loan losses. Direct investments do not appear related to
failure of any of the thrifts.
Benston's monograph also includes chapters devoted to an analysis of re-
turns and risk from direct investments over the three years ending 30 June
1984. He finds that direct investments yielded considerably higher returns
than other assets and appeared to reduce portfolio risk slightly. Another chap-
ter analyzes growth, return, and risk over the years 1981 through 1984 for
thrifts disaggregated into small (less than $100 million in assets) and large.
About half of the growth at fast-growing (over 15 percent a year) thrifts was
funded from jumbo CDs and brokered deposits, with the remaining funding
coming from ordinary deposits. Faster growing thrifts tended to increase reg-
ulatory net worth in about the same proportion as slower growing thrifts. The
funds generated by smaller, faster-growing thrifts were invested more in non-
residential mortgages, while the large, faster-growing thrifts invested more in
acquisition, development, and construction loans, and somewhat more in di-
rect investments. Regressions of the change in regulatory net worth over the
three years ending 30 June 1984 found growth significantly positively related316 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
to higher net worth. Thus, growth, as such, does not appear to be due to
financial weakness, which is inconsistent with the deposit-insurance hypoth-
esis.
Benston (1989)
Benston analyzed the change in tangible net worth (ATNW) over the two-
and-a-half years between 31 December 1983 and 30 June 1986 of all Califor-
nia thrifts operating since 31 December 1981, as functions of the amounts
of various types of assets on 31 December 1983 and on their change through
30 June 1986. Separate regressions also were computed for weak and stronger
thrifts (tangible net worth to total assets less or greater than 0.01 on 31 De-
cember 1983). ATNW is significantly positively related to the change in mul-
tifamily mortgages and beginning TNW, and to asset growth when residential
mortgage loans are omitted. Among the weak thrifts, only the change in mul-
tifamily mortgages is significantly (positively) associated with ATNW when
residential mortgage loans are omitted. Among the stronger thrifts, ATNW is
significantly positively associated with residential mortgage loans and asset
growth, and inversely with change in other real estate loans and change in
consumer loans, whether or not residential mortgage loans are excluded.
ATNW also was regressed on various income-statement flows over the two-
and-a-half-year period, with TNW on 31 December 1983 included and ex-
cluded. The only statistically significant positive relationships found are be-
tween ATNW and direct investments net income and net interest margin for
all samples, and also for income from foreclosed real estate operations, sale
of other assets, and adjustments to prior periods for the stronger thrifts and the
total sample. Thus, there is but weak support for the asset-deregulation hy-
pothesis.
Benston also analyzed 73 of the 82 thrifts that failed in 1986 (data on the
others could not be obtained) with respect to their TNW, direct investments
(DI), and nonresidential real estate loans (NREL), relative to total assets on
31 December 1985. Fifteen (21%) of the failed thrifts had DI in excess of 10
percent of their assets, while 66 (90%) had NREL in excess of 10 percent of
assets. Negative TNW was reported by 58 (79%) of the failed thrifts at the
year-end before failure; while this is not surprising, 48 of the 58 (83%) were
not closed until at least three months after their year-end balance sheet showed
negative TNW. Furthermore, 42 of the 73 failures in 1986 (58%) had negative
TNW on 31 December 1984.
Bank and Bradley (1989)
Barth and Bradley (hereafter BB) compare the performance of thrifts that
were solvent or insolvent (as defined by GAAP) at year-end, over the years
1979 though 1988 (second quarter). Through year-end 1984, the annual after-
tax net income of both groups moved similarly, with the insolvents' net in-
come lower. After 1984 the insolvent thrifts' losses as a percentage of assets
increase dramatically: -1.2 in 1985, -5.2 in 1986, -7.7 in 1987, and317 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
— 12.0 in 1988, due primarily to net non-operating losses. A detailed analysis
of June 1988 balance sheets reveals that insolvent thrifts held considerably
more commercial mortgages, somewhat more equity-risk investments and
brokered deposits, and slightly more commercial loans than solvent thrifts.
2
0
BB also show that more than two years before June 1988, 71 percent of the
GAAP-insolvent thrifts reported negative tangible capital, 61 percent reported
negative GAAP capital, and 53 percent reported negative RAP capital.
Carhill and Mauldin (1989) and Rudolf and Topping (1988)
These studies find that, from 1984 through 1988, thrifts with relatively high
percentages of assets in residential mortgages or mortgage-backed securities
were the most successful with respect to reported GAAP net profits, while
those that responded to deregulation by diversifying their portfolios and
adopting unconventional strategies were unsuccessful. The authors could not
determine whether unprofitable operations caused thrifts to adopt unconven-
tional strategies, unconventional strategies caused thrifts to become unprofit-
able, or the causation runs both ways.
The effect of competition and local market conditions on thrifts' profitabil-
ity and investment strategy was examined in Florida. This state's economy
has been stable through the 1980s (Fritz 1989), while competitive pressure
increased substantially and the financial health of financial intermediaries de-
clined dramatically (Hasan 1989). At the same time, Florida thrifts which
followed more nontraditional strategies did about as well as other thrifts.
Hence, both the poor financial condition of Florida thrifts and their adoption
of nontraditional strategies appear due primarily to the effects of increased
competition (Hasan 1989; Carhill 1989).
Risk as Indicated by Stock Market Data
Benston and Koehn (1990) used weekly rates of return of forty publicly
traded California thrifts from July 1978 through April 1985 to examine the
systematic risk of twenty-nine institutions that operated successfully through-
out the period compared to eleven that failed during the period. The failed
group tended to have higher institution-specific risk, which was shifted to
FSLIC. Risk-shifting did not appear to have been affected by the increase in
deposit ceilings, deregulation of interest rates, and expansion of asset powers.
Positive associations with overall risk were found only for low thrift net
worth, brokered deposits and direct investments at low-capital thrifts, and for
state-chartered rather than federally chartered thrifts.
10.3.2 FSLIC Losses
Earth, Brumbaugh, Sauerhaft, and Wang (1985) and Brumbaugh (1986)
BBSW examine the FSLIC's losses for 31 thrifts that failed during 1982-
83. They find a statistically significant relationship only for foreclosed real
estate (positive); direct investments (positive); and log of total assets (nega-318 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
tive). (All variables except log total assets are divided by total assets.) Unfor-
tunately, each of these variables was included without the other two in the
same regression. Hence, any one can stand for the other one or two.
Brumbaugh essentially replicates BBSW with an expanded sample of 88
thrifts that failed from 1982 through 1984. Various combinations of different
forms of the net worth variable together with two forms of the direct invest-
ments variable were tried in twelve regressions. Seven variables had signifi-
cant coefficients, as noted: net worth (negative for the tangible and market-
value forms, positive for the regulatory and GAAP forms); commercial loans
(often negative); slow loans and scheduled items (positive); foreclosed real
estate (often negative); direct investments (sometimes positive and sometimes
negative); jumbo CDs (positive); and brokered deposits (positive).
Earth, Brumbaugh, and Sauerhaft (1986)
This study analyzed 324 thrift failures from December 1981 through Octo-
ber 1985. It is notable because it includes a variable measuring the number of
months between insolvency and closure. The following variables are signifi-
cantly positively related to FSLIC losses: tangible net worth, cost of FHLBB
advances, delinquent loans, acquisition and development loans, direct invest-
ments, and months between insolvency and closure ("growth" is not included
as a variable). Total assets and the constant have negative significant coeffi-
cients. (All dollar variables are divided by total assets.)
Benston (1985, 1989)
The 1985 study regressed the FSLIC's losses at the 95 failed thrifts during
the period 1 January 1980 through 31 August 1985 for which the loss amounts
were made publicly available. Statistically significant positive coefficients
were found only for total assets, yield on total assets, brokered deposits to
earning assets, and change in nonresidential real estate loans to total loans.
Negative significant coefficients were found for change in total assets and
change in brokered deposits to earning assets (somewhat surprising results).
Direct investments to total assets were significantly and positively related to
FSLIC losses only for small thrifts, and this only when the change in direct
investments to total assets was excluded.
The 1990 study used all publicly available FSLIC loss data (28 thrifts) for
failures between 1 September 1985 through 31 December 1986. Significant
negative coefficients were found for adjustable-rate mortgages, residential
mortgages, and foreclosed real estate. The strongest relationship found was
for nonresidential mortgage loans, which are significantly positively related
to FSLIC losses.
10.3.3 Summary and Limitations
2'
The studies reviewed reveal several reasonably consistent findings. For
thrifts failing before 1986, the major variable distinguishing failed from op-319 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
erating thrifts is negative book-value (GAAP) net worth prior to failure. This
is hardly surprising, as this variable defines failure in an accounting sense.
However, negative net worth often precedes failure by several years. The
failed thrifts compared to nonfailed peers experienced lower return on total
assets, determined primarily by lower net interest margins resulting from a
higher cost of funds and larger proportions of interest-bearing liabilities to
earning assets. Among the asset holdings, foreclosed mortgages are higher at
failed thrifts. Nonresidential mortgages also are higher, although the relative
amounts vary considerably. Nonmortgage loans, direct investments, rapid
growth, brokered deposits, and large CDs are not significantly related to fail-
ure. The 1986 failures are characterized by negative tangible net worth and
relatively high proportions of nonresidential mortgages. Direct investments
appear to have played a minor role.
Failure, however, is not the same as insolvency, as many book-value insol-
vent institutions were permitted to continue operations. A comparison of
GAAP-solvent and — insolvent institutions shows that after 1984 the insolvent
institutions had considerable increases in non-operating losses. The 1988
GAAP-insolvent institutions held relatively more commercial mortgages,
equity-risk investments, and brokered deposits than solvent institutions. A
high proportion of these insolvent thrifts reported negative tangible capital at
least two years before 1988.
Studies of changes in tangible net worth at California thrifts over the two-
and-a-half years ending 30 June 1986 find a positive association with direct
investments, multifamily mortgages, residential mortgages, and higher
growth rates. A negative association is found for other real estate loans.
Evidence of risk-shifting to the FSLIC by California publicly traded thrifts
is reported. Higher risks appear to have been taken by thrifts with low capital
and those with state rather than federal charters, and are associated with direct
investments and brokered deposits only at low-capital institutions.
Losses reported by the FSLIC are associated with higher levels of commer-
cial real estate loans, foreclosed real estate, acquisition and development
loans, time between insolvency and closure, change in total assets and bro-
kered deposits, and possibly with direct investments, jumbo CDs, and bro-
kered deposits.
A major shortcoming of most of these studies is that they are based on
accounting book values. Neither GAAP nor regulatory accounting permits
thrifts to record losses or gains on assets unless these assets are sold. (Regu-
latory accounting even permits institutions to defer recording losses on mort-
gage sales.) Hence, the effect of changes in interest rates is not recorded when
they occur, but rather over time in the form of lower- or higher-than-market
interest earnings. Furthermore, there is reason to believe that many thrifts did
not record credit losses until after they clearly were insolvent. For these rea-
sons, it is essential that the net worth of thrifts be restated at market values
before an analysis of their performance is undertaken.320 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
An additional shortcoming is the use of cross-sections rather than time-
series of thrifts. Changes in thrifts' performance need not have taken place
within a year or two. Consequently, we sought to examine a sample of thrifts
overtime.
10.4 Market-value Estimates
Accounting values reflect the market value of assets and liabilities at the
time they are acquired. In accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP), subsequent changes in market conditions and price levels
are ignored, except for physical assets and marketable securities that suffer
"permanent" price declines. In particular, changes in interest rates are ig-
nored, even when the consequence is a substantial reduction in the present
value of a financial asset or liability. Under GAAP, changes in the probability
that cash flows on financial assets, such as loans, will be less than previously
expected normally should be accounted for by reductions in asset amounts
through increases in a contra-asset account, "allowance for loan losses." How-
ever, these valuations often are not reliable, and reporting has been at the
discretion of the thrift managers. GAAP-determined numbers, therefore, do
not provide valid measures of economic market values, particularly during
periods of changing interest rates and credit risk, such as the 1980s. If one is
to describe the incentives facing thrift owners, one should improve on ac-
counting values as measurements of the economic value of the owners' invest-
ments in their enterprises.
The Federal Home Loan Bank of Atlanta Market-Value Model (MVM) is
designed to provide this improvement. (For a complete documentation, see
Benston, Carhill, and Olasov 1991.) The data base comes from the Thrift
Financial Report (TFR), in which each thrift reports quarterly detailed finan-
cial information. Contract maturities and rates of interest for each thrift's fi-
nancial assets and liabilities have been reported in the TFR Section H, begin-
ning with the first quarter of 1984. This section of the TFR was unchanged
through 1988; it was revised substantially in June 1989. We supplemented
these data with our model's prepayment projections, the FHLBB's estimated
decay rates for passbook liabilities, and thrift-specific credit experience. The
result is a detailed cash-flow projection for each thrift, which lends itself to
discounted-cash-flow analysis.
Concurrent market interest rates and standard present-value equations are
used to discount the expected cash flows. On the liability side, we discount
the thrifts' payout cash flows by the concurrent certificate of deposit (CD)
rates, which we assume are the marginal cost of attracting funds. Because
passbook deposits carry rates below current CD rates, the discounting results
in a lower-than-book-value number; the reduction often is considered an asset,
the "core deposit intangible." On the asset side, we use secondary market
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merit rate (which includes a factor for credit risk) is used to discount cash
flows from mortgage loans. Commercial loan rates from Federal Reserve sur-
vey information are used to discount cash flows from commercial loans.
Agency rates are used to discount cash flows from securities portfolios. The
available interest rates generally do not include all maturities. We constructed
a full term structure for each interest rate from the U.S. Treasury bill and note
series.
Mortgage-servicing rights are estimated by multiplying "mortgages ser-
viced for others less mortgages serviced by others" by 1.75 percent, which a
review of the literature and interviews with market participants revealed to be
reasonably accurate in the absence of more detailed information. Recorded
intangible assets, such as goodwill and various deferrals, are assumed to have
zero values. All remaining assets and noninterest-bearing liabilities are valued
at GAAP book values.
While some commentators have expressed the reservation that present-
value mathematics and the choice of discount rates is too complicated to pro-
vide valid value estimates, our experience does not confirm this objection. We
found the selection and justification of discount rates and the mathematics,
although quite tedious, to be workable and noncontroversial. However, there
are three aspects of the MVM which create considerable difficulties or are
potentially controversial: the lack of thrift-specific information, which neces-
sitates generic assumptions; the use of standard present-valuation methodol-
ogy, which implicitly assumes a random walk of the term structure of inter-
est rates in place of a "normal-rate" assumption; and the treatment of credit
quality.
We use generic assumptions because thrift-specific assumptions would be
feasible only in a small-sample study. For example, the TFR does not provide
information on the composition of thrifts' security portfolios, so the MVM
discounts all security portfolios at the interest rate on federal agency debt.
This procedure can result in a material misstatement of high-gross-yield,
high-risk assets, such as "junk" bonds and some commercial and nonresiden-
tial real estate loans.
2
2 These and other generic assumptions are the primary
disadvantage of using the MVM in place of RAP, GAAP, or GAAP-tangible
book values, which give the balances of more specific assets and liabilities.
We emphasize that this disadvantage does not apply to market-value account-
ing, per se, which could use all the information provided by current account-
ing methodologies plus those data gathered from on-site inspections, but only
to large-scale estimation of market values from generic financial reports.
While standard present-value methodology and the efficient-market hypoth-
esis are generally accepted, their assumption that current market and term
structure of interest rates provide the best estimate of future rates of interest
may not reflect the perceptions of market participants. For example, a current
version of the "conventional wisdom" alleges that rates of interest on mort-
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"normal-rate hypothesis" a la Wall Street. If the normal-rate hypothesis were
correct, our method would understate market values when rates are above
their norm, and overstate market values when rates are below their norm.
Commercial, construction, and development mortgage loans present a spe-
cial problem. Much like zero-coupon bonds, these loans often do not require
interim payments, and thus do not become delinquent for many years. Yet,
they are usually high risk, and so carry high rates of interest. Thus, our delin-
quency-based approach to market valuation of risky loans might overstate the
market values of thrifts with a high proportion of such risky loans. To check
for this problem, we examined a number of thrifts. Surprisingly, this inspec-
tion revealed that, for thrifts with risky but stable portfolio strategies, delin-
quencies generally had time to "catch up" to the high yields, resulting in little
overestimation of market values. However, for those few thrifts that radically
and suddenly shift their portfolios, our delinquency-based approach appears
to yield overstated net worth. In addition, because we discount all mortgage
loans by the same (Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation commitment)
rate, we tend to overstate the present value of loans with lagged delinquencies.
This measurement problem appears important for explaining the failure of
apparently initially solvent thrifts (see later discussion of tables 10.8 and
10.9).
The ultimate test of the MVM is its ability to predict, relative to the alter-
native measures provided by RAP, GAAP, and tangible book values. As de-
tailed in Benston, Carhill, and Olasov (1991), despite its generic nature, the
MVM outperforms these alternative estimates, particularly in predicting thrift
failures. However, we were not able to reject the hypothesis that the market
follows the normal-rate hypothesis; values from the MVM perform well in
predicting the direction of stock-price movements, but appear to overstate vol-
atility.
10.5 Empirical Analysis of Southeastern Thrifts
The Southeast refers to the area supervised and served by the Federal Home
Loan Bank of Atlanta (district 4). It includes Alabama, the District of Colum-
bia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Vir-
ginia. The area is quite diverse in that it encompasses rural and urban com-
munities and states with stable, growing, and declining economies. As such,
it represents a good cross-section of the United States, with the notable excep-
tion of the boom and bust southwestern states of Texas, Louisiana, Colorado,
and Arizona, where a very large part of the losses imposed on the FSLIC (and
later on its successors, the FDIC and taxpayers) occurred. Hence, although
the findings reported likely are not representative of the southwestern states,
they probably provide a good picture of the rest of the nation. In this study,
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1984. These are 16.5 percent of the 3,136 U.S. total. In terms of total assets
at book value, the southeastern thrifts represent 15.6 percent of the U.S. total.
Thrifts "fail" when the FHLBB (now the Office of Thrift Supervision, or
OTS) decides to close them, place them in conservatorship, or force their
merger with another institution, often with resources provided by the FSLIC
(now the FDIC). Clearly, this is an insufficient definition of failure or measure
of the cost of the S&L debacle to solvent thrifts and banks and to the taxpay-
ers. Consequently, we measure the cost in terms of economic market value of
equity—assets less liabilities that were not insured, de facto or de jure, by the
FSLIC. A thrift's losses, then, are measured by the decline in its market-value
equity adjusted for dividends and equity issues or distributions.
10.5.1 Losses Through Year-End 1984 at Thrifts Then Operating
It would have been interesting to have measured the effect of interest rate
changes on the present values of thrifts' assets and liabilities year by year
from, say, 1977, when the rise in interest rates began. Interest rates on 10-
year U.S. Treasury notes, the duration of which is roughly comparable to
mortgages with 30-year contracted maturities (the average for thrift mortgages
is about 25 years), were relatively stable in the years before 1977. This rate
then rose from 7.8 percent at year-end 1977 to a peak of 15.8 percent in Sep-
tember 1981, declined to 10.5 percent at year-end 1982, and was 11.6 percent
at year-end 1984. Unfortunately, the data which we require to estimate present
values were not reported by thrifts until 1984. However, if one assumes that
the administration and/or the Congress did not act to close economically in-
solvent thrifts because they expected interest rates to decline, it is reasonable
to expect that the benefits from lower interest rates should have been fully
accomplished by 1984. The FHLBB, as well as the managers and owners of
operating thrifts, should have had little reason to expect further benefits from
still lower interest rates, particularly considering that interest rates had in-
creased again (by about 90 basis points) between 1982 and 1984.
We should measure the losses incurred from interest rate changes as the
present value of affected assets and liabilities at year-end 1984 less the present
value of those mortgages at year-end 1977, both in amounts and as percent-
ages of the asset and liability values and net worth at year-end 1977. For these
measures to be meaningful, we must adjust the beginning balances for pay-
ments made over the period and new mortgages put on the books during the
period. Fortunately, this apparently formidable task can be accomplished
rather easily for financial assets.
Because of the relative stability of interest rates before 1977, we can as-
sume that the book values of mortgages still outstanding at year-end 1984
provide valid measures of their present values at year-end 1977. Mortgages
booked over the period 1977 through 1984 should have been recorded at their
market values when the mortgages were made. Reductions in mortgages as a
result of payments, payoffs, and write-offs are reflected in the year-end 1984324 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
book values. Hence, these year-end figures accurately reflect the original mar-
ket values of mortgages made before year-end 1984 and still outstanding at
that time. Similarly, the book values of other assets and liabilities measure
their present values at the beginning and during the years prior to year-end
1984. Hence, we measure the change in present value for financial asset / from
1977 through 1984 as
(1) CAViAt = AMlt - ABit,
where CAViAt is the change in asset fs value over time t— 1 through t(&t), and
AMit and ABit are the asset's market and book values at time t.
These changes in value also are presented as percentages of total assets at
book value, the book values of the individual assets at year-end 1984 (time i),
and as percentages of the book value of net worth at year-end 1984 to show
the relative change in values. These later ratios are measured as
(2) CAV^IAB, = CAVAiAl
where CAViAt is the change in asset value to the book value of the asset.
2
3
We calculate a similar measure for liabilities. The difference between the
book and market values of the liabilities on 31 December 1984, however, does
not measure fully the impact of interest rate changes between 1977 and 1984.
In 1977, thrifts undoubtedly had a "core deposit intangible" asset (the differ-
ence between the market and book value of deposits) because Regulation Q
constrained the amounts that could be paid directly to depositors and thrifts
had unrecorded goodwill. Hence, the book value of deposit and other liabili-
ties on 31 December 1984 does not measure their market values at year-end
1977 or in the intervening years. We should note, though, that the lower level
of market interest rates in 1977 (the January three-month Treasury bill rate is
4.62 percent) gave rise to smaller core deposit intangible amounts.
The amount of the loss, as calculated with equation (1), provides a measure
of the amount lost primarily as a result of the 1979-82 increase in interest
rates and their subsequent decline through year-end 1984. The 517 southeast-
ern thrifts operating on 31 December 1984 had aggregate RAP net worth of
$5,814 million. The net worth of these thrifts at market values totaled
— $2,264 million (—1.5 percent of their total assets at book value). Thus,
they suffered an aggregate loss of $8,078 million (5.3 percent of their total
assets). It should be recalled that our measure of present values includes the
effect of expected credit losses as well as interest rate losses and gains. Hence,
the asset losses measured tend to overstate the losses due to interest rate
changes. In 1984 the overstatement decreases market values by about 12 per-
cent, on average.
Table 10.2 presents the numbers derived from equations (1) and (2) for net
worth, assets, and liabilities at the 517 FSLIC-insured thrifts operating in the325 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
Table 10.2 Interest-Rate-Induced Changes in Asset and Liability Values at 517 Thrifts
Operating at Year-end 1984
Mean
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3Difference as of 1984 only; 1977 amount not deducted (see text for details).
Southeast as of year-end 1984. Panel A shows the change in value (market
less book) as percentages of total assets at book value at each thrift. The mean
reduction in net worth is 3.6 percent (the median reduction is 3.5). At least
three-quarters of the 517 thrifts suffered reductions in net worth that were not
recorded according to RAP. Mortgages in total are responsible for reducing
assets by a mean of 3.7 percent. Almost all of this reduction is due to 1-4
family fixed-interest mortgages; adjustable-rate mortgages, other mortgages,
second mortgages, and securities contributed but slightly to the change in net
worth, on average, and at the extremes.
2
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(of which there were hardly any at southeastern thrifts) and securities were of
small importance.
2
5 We valued the intangible asset for mortgaging servicing
as 1.75 percent of mortgages serviced for others,
2
6 and removed the asset
"purchased mortgage servicing"; as a result, total assets increased on average
by 0.1 percent. The removal of other book-value intangibles, primarily good-
will and deferred losses on mortgage sales, resulted in an additional decrease
in net worth of about 0.8 percentage points, on average. In total, the revalua-
tion of financial assets to market decreased book net worth as a percentage of
total assets by 4.6 percent, at the average (mean) thrift. Passbook accounts
have considerably lower market than book values, giving rise to the core-
deposit intangible asset (recorded in table 10.2 as a decrease in the liability).
At the average thrift, this intangible increased the book value of net worth by
1.9 percent of total assets. As noted above, an unknown proportion of the
core-deposit intangible asset existed in earlier years, although the differential
between market and passbook rates was considerably smaller in 1977 than in
subsequent years. Increases in the market value over book of other liabilities
decreased net worth by 0.8 percentage points.
Panel B of table 10.2 shows the percentage change in value of net worth,
assets, and liabilities to their book values at year-end 1984. Net worth de-
creased by 71.5 percent on average. The range of this change is considerable
because some thrifts had low RAP net worth.
2
7 Total mortgages at market
value are lower by an average of 4.7 percent of their book values. The greatest
decrease (relative to the balances outstanding) is in fixed-rate 1-4 family
mortgages (7.2 percent) and other mortgages (5.1 percent). The market values
of adjustable-rate mortgages are higher than their book values, by an average
of 1.6 percent. As shown in panel A, fixed-rate 1-4 family mortgages domi-
nate the mortgages held by the southeastern thrifts. Passbook deposits' market
value is 25.1 percent lower than book value, on average. The effect of this
large reduction in the value of this liability on net worth is mitigated consid-
erably because passbook deposits are a relatively small percentage of most
thrifts' liabilities. The market and book values of other deposits and liabilities
were similar because these liabilities tend to be more exposed to competitive
pricing pressures.
Several factors may be responsible for one or another thrift absorbing larger
or smaller market-value losses or (in a few cases) gains. As discussed above
in section 10.2 with respect to hypotheses 3 and 6, these factors include the
thrifts' initial net worth position, economic conditions in an area, opportuni-
ties for diversification, and type of thrift ownership. To test these hypotheses,
as well as to gain a greater understanding of the phenomenon, we examined
the following relationship:
(3) CAWA84 = b0 + bx TA84 + b2 TAl + b3 M * TA%4 + bj 5. * TAS4,
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CAWA84 = change in net worth (market less book value) through year-end
1984;
TA&4 = total assets at book value at time t = year-end 1984 (book
value is used as the "size" variable because this measures the
amount originally invested by each thrift);
M = 1 if a mutual thrift, 0 if a stock, multiplied by TAS4 to account
for the expectation that the effect of ownership form is propor-
tional to the size of an institution; and
Sj = state dummy, equals 1 for each state j with the exception of
North Carolina or Florida (the states with the most thrifts), one
of which is omitted to avoid overidentiflcation, multiplied by
TA to account for the expectation that the effect of state loca-
tion is proportional to the size of an institution.
The square to total assets is included to test the hypothesis that the change in
net worth is not related linearly to size. To reduce the effect of collinearity, the
variables are divided by TA and equation (3') was calculated:
(3') CAWA84 / TA84 = 1 / TAM + 1 + b2 TA%4 + b3 M + bj 5.. The coefficients estimated are presented in table 10.3, with the dummy var-
iables for Florida and North Carolina included or omitted. The intercept
(which measures the effect of TA) is significantly negative, indicating that
larger thrifts experienced greater amounts of net worth losses than smaller
thrifts (which is not surprising, as the larger thrifts had more to lose). The
coefficient of TA (which measures TA
2) also is significantly negative, indicat-
ing that the loss at larger thrifts is proportionately greater than at smaller
thrifts. Mutuals also had greater net worth losses than stocks, cet. par. The
only statistically significant state dummy variable is for Virginia, which ap-
pears to have experienced greater reductions in equity, cet. par.
We examined further the reasons for the thrifts' change in net worth and the
level of market-value net worth at year-end 1984 by regressing these variables
on the thrifts' June 1982 amounts of book-value net worth, passbook deposit
accounts, and 1-4 family mortgages, and the growth in their assets from June
1982 through December 1984. We used June 1982 as the beginning date be-
cause this preceded passage of the Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 which "de-
regulated" thrift assets and was coincident with the gradual removal of Regu-
lation Q ceilings on deposit interest rates, and preceded the introduction (in
December 1982) of money market deposit accounts that allowed thrifts to
compete with money market mutual funds. The available data are deficient in
two important regards. First, the number of observations are smaller because
485 of the 517 thrifts operating at year-end 1984 were operating in June 1982
(the balance were chartered in the interim). Nevertheless, the mean net worth
change for this subset of - 3.82 percent is similar to the mean change for the
full data set of - 3.56 percent. Second, we are unable to identify and separate328 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
Table 10.3 Change in Market-Value Net Worth through Year-end 1984 Related
to Size, Ownership Form, and State Location (equation [3']),
Coefficients and [Probability Coefficient > 0]
Mean of Dependent Variable (in percentage):
Market less Book Value of Net Worth + Total Assets = -3.56%
Coefficients [prob > 0] Excluding:
Independent Variables








North Carolina = 1
Florida = 1
District of Columbia = 1
Alabama = 1
Georgia = 1

























































"Eight observations omitted because states were not known.
asset growth due to mergers from growth from deposits and borrowings. (As
shown in table 10.6, growth through mergers skews the mean rate).
We ran the following regressions:
(4a)CAWA84 / TAM = 1 / TAM + 1 + c2 TAM + c3 Jl c5 PD%2
A. r M + c NWR
TAM + c61-4M%21 TAM + c7 ATA I TAM,
where
NWBi2 = book-value net worth on 30 June 1982;
PDi2 = passbook deposits on 30 June 1982;329 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
1-4MS2 = 1 to 4 family mortgages (including second mortgages and con-
struction loans on 1-4 family dwellings);
2
8 and
ATA = change in total assets from 30 June 1982 through 31 December
1984;
and the other variables are as described for equation (3).
(4b)AWM8 c3M c4 NWBS2 TA
c5 PD$2 TA c6 l-4M%2 c7 ATA
where
AWM84 = net worth at market value at year-end 1984.
The state dummy variables were not included in the regressions because they
are generally insignificant and their inclusion would reduce the sample by
eight observations (see table 10.3).
The coefficients, presented in table 10.4, show (as in table 10.3) that total
asset size (measured by the intercept in equations [4a] and [4b]) is signifi-
cantly inversely related to the change in net worth and to the year-end 1984
amount of market-value net worth; both total assets and total assets squared
Table 10.4 Change in Market-Value Net Worth through Year-end 1984 Related to Size,
Ownership Form, and Mid-year 1982 Values (equation [4]), Coefficients and
[Probability Coefficient > 0]
Independent Variables
1/Total assets ($ thousands)
[intercept]
Intercept [total assets]
Total assets ($ thousands)
[total assets squared]
Mutual = 1, Stock = 0
Book value net worth 6/82 -e-
total assets, in percentages
Passbook deposits 6/82 -r-
total assets, in percentages
1-4 Family mortgages 6/82 -H
total assets, in percentages
Asset growth, 6/82-12/84 +




Mean of Dependent Variables (in percentages)
Market less Book Value
of Net Worth -r
Total Assets = -3.82%











Market Value of Net
Worth at Year-end 1984












Note: Total assets as of year-end 1984.330 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
have negative significant coefficients. Mutual thrifts experienced a greater re-
duction in net worth by one percentage point, on average. The June 1982
amounts of book-value net worth and passbook deposits are significantly pos-
itively related and mortgages on 1-4 family dwellings are inversely related (at
the 0.15 level) to the change in net worth and amount of market-value net
worth. Asset growth is significantly positively related to the dependent vari-
ables, a finding that is inconsistent with the belief that growth, as such, was
detrimental to thrifts, at least through year-end 1984.
Assuming that the June 1982 book values reflect the thrifts' pre-1979 mar-
ket values, these results indicate that the thrifts that experienced reductions in
net worth (many of which became economically insolvent, as shown in table
10.6) were those with low initial percentages to total assets of net worth and
of passbook deposits (see tables 10.4 and 10.6). Low relative amounts of
passbook deposits are consistent with thrifts having obtained deposits from
outside their local market areas, perhaps because they faced strong local com-
petition. These results, together with the inverse relationship between asset
size and the change and level of year-end 1984 market-value net worth, are
consistent with the hypothesis that the thrifts that became insolvent when in-
terest rates increased in 1979-81 were those that had expanded beyond their
passbook-deposit base without proportionately having increased their net
worth. The negative sign of the coefficient of the 1-4 family mortgages vari-
able indicates that these mortgages (which, in 1982, were largely fixed-rate,
longer-term obligations) also are responsible for reductions in and lower
amounts of market-value net worth.
10.5.2 The Behavior of Continuing and Failed Thrifts Classified by
Market-Value Solvency
It is likely that financial institutions take actions with consequences that
occur over a period longer than a year. Consequently, we first examine the
investments and changes in net worth of thrifts classified according to their
economic (market-value) net worth at the end of 1984 over the years through
1988. The observations are divided into two groups: thrifts that operated
throughout the period and those that ceased operations as a result of failure.
Those that ceased being independent institutions because of voluntary merg-
ers are not included in this group and are not analyzed at this point. This
separation was made so that the changes over time would not be subjected to
sample-composition bias, at least for those thrifts that continued operating.
Continuously Operating Thrifts
The continuously operating thrifts also are classified according to whether
their net worth to total assets in market values at year-end 1984 is < — 3%,
- 3% < 0%, 0% < 3%, 3% < 6%, and 6% and over. The assets, net worths,
and liabilities as percentages of total assets (at book values) of these thrifts
then are given for each year.
2
9 Table 10.5 presents the data for the 455 thrifts331 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
Table 10.5 455 Thrifts in Continuous Operation from 1984 through 1988 (asset and
liability amounts as percentage of book-value total assets except where
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Table 10.5 (continued)
Market Value of Net Worth/Total Assets (in percentages)
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that operated continuously through year-end 1988.
3
0 Data on the 31 thrifts that
were terminated during this period are presented in table 10.7. (The remaining
31 thrifts that ceased independent operations for other reasons are not in-
cluded in this portion of the analysis.)
Considering first the 455 continuously operating thrifts, as of year-end
1984, 77 (17% of the sample) had market-value equity to asset ratios of less
than - 3 percent, 106 (23%) had ratios between - 3 and 0 percent, 112 (25%)
between 0 and 3 percent, 82 (18%) between 3 and 6 percent, and 78 (17%) 6
percent and over. Table 10.5 shows an inverse relationship between market-
value solvency and total asset size, which also is revealed by the statistically
significant negative coefficient of total assets estimated for equations 3' and
4b (see tables 10.3 and 10.4). This relationship continues throughout the five-
year period and probably back at least to mid 1982. Table 10.6 presents data
on the book-value net worth to total assets and passbook deposits to total
assets as of 30 June 1982 and the percentage growth in total assets through 31
December 1984 of the 485 thrifts operating on 30 June 1982. While this group
is not directly comparable to the 455 continuously operating thrifts because of
merger and new charters before year-end 1984 and cessation of operations
after year-end 1984, it provides a valuable (and the only available) bench-
mark.
One reason for the solvency of southeastern thrifts at year-end 1984 appears
to be a higher relative ratio of passbook deposits to total assets. Solvency and
the percentage of passbook deposits are directly related, and smaller thrifts
tend to have relatively more of these deposits, both at mid-year 1982 and year-
end 1984. While the percentage of passbook deposits over the period declined
by 54 to 61 percent (which is not surprising, considering the large increase in
market interest rates and much smaller rise in the Regulation Q ceiling), the334 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
solvent thrifts still held larger percentages at year-end 1984 than the insolvent
thrifts. As noted above, higher proportions of passbook deposits also may
proxy for the competitiveness of the thrifts' marketplace. (Had we the data,
we would have related the solvency of thrifts to their Herflndahl index or other
measure of competition.) Thus, the solvent thrifts appear to have benefited
from a slower run-off of their below-market-rate liabilities and possibly from
less competition in their markets. This conclusion is supported by the regres-
sion reported in table 10.3, which shows a significant positive relationship
between market-value net worth and passbook deposits.
Another hypothesis for the inverse relationship between size and solvency
is that thrifts rendered insolvent by the 1979-81 sharp increase in interest
rates may have grown relatively more rapidly before 1984, in an attempt to
"grow" out of their old balance sheets, than those that were still solvent in
1982. The data presented in tables 10.4 and 10.6, though, are inconsistent
with this hypothesis. The regression coefficients given in table 10.4 show a
significant positive relationship between asset growth and market-value net
worth. The magnitude of the relationship, though, is small: a $100 million
increase in assets is associated with a $100,000 increase in market-value net
worth. The univariate relationship shown in table 10.6 indicates that most of
the measured multivariate positive relationship is due to the group with
market-value net worth above 6 percent. This group has a relatively large
number of newly chartered thrifts, as indicated by the small assets size and
the greater number at year-end 1984 than at mid-year 1982 (at least 78 com-
pared to 61).
3
1 Hence, it is not surprising that the group experienced higher
mean growth rates. (Newly chartered thrifts also are less likely to have suf-
fered from interest-rate-increase induced losses, as they have more currently
priced fixed-rate mortgages.) Table 10.6 gives mean growth rates over the
entire period and over the eighteen months ending 31 December 1983. Over
both periods the rate of growth of the solvent thrifts exceed that of the insol-
vent thrifts. The table also shows the median, quartile, and five and ninety-
five percentile growth rates. These data reveal that the mean growth rates are
considerably affected by some large values, probably the result of mergers.
We consider the median rates, therefore, more meaningful indicators of
growth due to the acquisition of deposits and debt. These rates for the entire
period and the period through year-end 1983 show only slightly higher growth
for the more solvent thrifts. This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis
that insolvent and weak thrifts took advantage of deposit insurance to grow
excessively. This contention also is inconsistent with the positive relationship
found between growth and solvency for the June 1982 through December
1984 period, as shown in table 10.4.
A third hypothesis is that thrifts' year-end 1984 insolvency is due to their
prior net worth position. This hypothesis is supported by the "market value of
net worth at year-end 1984" regression given in table 10.4 and the book-value
net worth reported in table 10.6. The coefficient of "book-value net worth335 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
Table 10.6 485 Thrifts' Characteristics from June 1982 (grouped by market-value net
worth to total assets as of 31 December 1984)
Market Value of Net Worth/Total Assets (in percentages)
< - 3% -3%<0% 0% < 3% 3% < 6% > 6%
Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error Std. Error
Mean of Mean Mean of Mean Mean of Mean Mean of Mean Mean of Mean
Book-value net worth to total assets, in percentages
2.7 0.2 3.7 0.1 5.5 0.4 5.9 0.3 6.5 0.8
Passbook deposits to total assets, in percentages
12.5 0.5 12.6 0.4 13.5 0.5 15.5 0.7 22.8 1.5
Growth in total assets from 6/82 to 12/84, in percentages







Growth in total assets from 6/83 to 12/84, in percentages





























































6/82" of 1.65 in table 10.4 indicates a greater than proportional relationship
between book value on 30 June 1982 and market-value net worth on 31 De-
cember 1984. Table 10.6 shows that the very insolvent thrifts (< 3% market-
value net worth to total assets) had mean book-value net worth of 2.7 percent
and the — 3% < 0% thrifts had mean book-value net worth of 3.7 percent of
total assets at mid-year 1982. In comparison, the solvent thrifts had mean
book-value net worth of at least 5.5 percent of total assets (the differences are
statistically significant).
Returning now to table 10.5, the second group of figures, market-value net
worth to total assets at market value, indicates that the average relative sol-
vency position of the continuously operating thrifts improved dramatically in
1985 when interest rates declined, for all except the strongest group (> 6%),
but did not change much thereafter. The continuous decline in the strongest336 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
groups' average market-value net worth appears to be due to rapid expansion
by strong, small, often newly chartered thrifts, as shown by the increase in
the average amounts of total assets. After 1985 the average market-value ra-
tios remain fairly constant. These data are not consistent with the hypothesis
that insolvent and weak thrifts engaged in excessive risk-taking resulting in
net losses, on average. (Note that these data do not include thrifts that failed
during the period.) However, the regulatory book-value net worth ratios for
the insolvent groups tend to increase more than for the solvent thrifts. This
may reflect their strong incentive to use RAP modifications to bolster reported
capital, thereby preventing takeover by the authorities. As is shown later, the
increase in RAP net worth of insolvent thrifts is not simply a function of their
having taken and benefited from additional interest-rate risk.
Surprisingly, perhaps, growth in assets does not appear to be a function of
the market-value solvency of the thrifts in the post-1984 years, nor (as we
report above) in the mid 1982 through year-end 1984 period. Indeed, the 1984
insolvent thrifts grew at a slower rate than the solvent thrifts, particularly the
strongest thrifts. This finding is inconsistent with the "deposit-insurance" hy-
pothesis.
All groups tended to decrease their investment in fixed-interest-rate 1-4
family first mortgages and increase their holdings of adjustable-rate mort-
gages (relative to total assets). Investment in traditional (1-4 family first)
mortgages relative to total assets is not very different among the solvent
groups, with the exception of the < —3% net worth group, where the per-
centage is significantly lower by about five percentage points. The percent-
ages of fixed- and adjustable-interest-rate mortgages to total assets is insignif-
icantly different among the groups. Multifamily and nonresidential mortgages
relative to total assets decreased significantly over the period and are about the
same for all groups. Second mortgages are a significantly higher percentage
of total assets at the most insolvent thrifts after 1985, although the average
percentage only reaches 1.7 (in 1988). This may, however, signal a willing-
ness among these thrifts to accept higher loan-to-value loans—the most im-
portant indicator of credit losses on mortgages. On the whole, though, the
data are inconsistent with the hypothesis that insolvency encouraged thrifts to
take advantage of expanded mortgage loan powers.
Commercial loans are also small proportions of total assets for all groups,
but are similar among the groups. Consumer loans, though, are a relatively
greater percentage of total assets, on average, at the most insolvent thrifts;
however, the difference is greatest for the most insolvent group, which has
significantly higher percentages than the most solvent group (e.g., in 1986,
5.5 vs. 3.1 percent). Investment securities are higher percentages of total as-
sets at the most solvent thrifts. Given that consumer loans are not considered
to be inherently risky and were permitted prior to the Garn-St Germain Act
of 1982, this evidence either is inconsistent with the "insolvency-driven, ex-
cessive risk-taking" and "asset-deregulation" hypotheses, indicates that asset337 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
type is an inadequate measure of risk (which is contrary to the basic consump-
tion of the "asset-deregulation" hypothesis), or supports the view that the
fourth district supervisors were effective in restraining excessive risk-taking.
The delinquency percentages (to mortgages outstanding) are available only
for portfolios of mortgages and nonmortgages. All groups experienced signif-
icant increases in delinquencies (which our model assumes are total losses).
The delinquency rates are not significantly different among the groups with
respect to solvency, which is inconsistent with the "insolvency-driven, exces-
sive risk-taking" hypothesis. However, the delinquency rate on nonmortgages
is significantly higher and escalates quickly for the very insolvent thrifts after
1985, particularly as compared to the strongest thrifts. These data are consist-
ent with the hypothesis and perhaps with the "asset-deregulation" hypothesis,
although with commercial mortgages included in the mortgage delinquency
rate, the hypothesis cannot really be tested with these data. Furthermore, as
noted above, nonmortgage (commercial and consumer) loans are relatively
small percentages of total assets at most thrifts, although relatively high delin-
quencies on small amounts of loans could be sufficient to drive weakly capi-
talized thrifts into insolvency.
On the whole, the data appear inconsistent with the hypothesis that insol-
vency and low capital ratios, measured in market-value terms, encouraged
surviving thrifts to take excessively high risks, nor did their operations tend
to result in large losses. Alternatively, the supervisory authorities may have
constrained excessive risk-taking. However, the sample is biased in that the
institutions that were closed (failed) are not included. We turn to those now.
Failed Thrifts
Table 10.7 shows the assets and liabilities of the 35 thrifts that were oper-
ating at year-end 1984 and closed by year-end 1988. The table presents finan-
cial ratios for these thrifts in the year-ends preceding failure. The failed thrifts
are smaller, on average, than the most insolvent operating thrifts (although the
large standard errors of the means among the 1986 and 1987 failures indicates
a wide variance) and about the same size as the weak operating thrifts.
3
2 The
market-value net-worth-to-total-assets-at-market percentages indicate they
were insolvent, on average, in the years before they were closed. Examination
of the individual data indicates that most of these thrifts were insolvent in
those years. However, on average and individually, they rarely were book-
value insolvent except in the year just preceding their being closed.
High rates of growth did not precede failure, on average and (with a few
exceptions) individually, which again is inconsistent with the "deposit-
insurance" hypothesis. The small average amounts of brokered deposits as a
percentage of total liabilities also is inconsistent with this hypothesis. (In-
deed, only two thrifts in each failure year had more than trivial amounts of
brokered deposits.) Deposits over $100,000 as a percentage of total liabilities
are relatively larger at the failed thrifts (compare with tables 10.8 and 10.9),
3
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which indicates that they had local funding problems but were able to obtain
partially insured funds. This conclusion is supported by the failed thrifts' rel-
atively lower amount of deposits under $100,000 as compared to the stronger
operating thrifts. However, in the year before their failure, the percentage of
deposits over $100,000 decreased substantially (indicating that holders of
these deposits correctly predicted failure) and the percentage of fully insured
deposits increased, but not sufficiently to offset the decrease in partially in-
sured funds. The shortfall was made up with advances from the Federal Home
Loan Bank.
Nontraditional assets (first mortgages other than 1-4 family loans, com-
mercial and consumer loans, and real estate held for investment) are consid-
erably higher at the failed thrifts, although there is little evidence of increase
over the time before they were closed. Traditional mortgages as a percentage
of total assets are about two-thirds of the percentages at operating thrifts, par-
ticularly for thrifts that failed before 1988. The percentages of fixed- and
adjustable-interest-rate mortgages to total assets are not significantly different
from the operating groups, with the exception of the three thrifts that failed in
1985. These thrifts concentrated on traditional mortgages and held almost no
adjustable-interest-rate mortgages, which appears to account for their early
failure.
After 1985, delinquencies play a large role in the failure of southeastern
thrifts. The delinquency rates (to mortgages and to nonmortgage loans out-
standing) are significantly higher among the failed thrifts compared to all ex-
cept the most insolvent operating thrifts. However, unlike these institutions,
the failed thrifts' delinquency rates tend to be higher for mortgage than for
nonmortgage loans. This may be due to their capitalizing unpaid interest on
restructured commercial loans. In all cases, delinquencies rapidly escalated
from year to year as weak credits emerged or supervisors forced recognition.
10.5.3 The Behavior of Thrifts that Were Market-Value Insolvent or
Solvent at Year-End 1984 and That Subsequently Were Closed or
Open through 31 March 1990
The analysis of operating and failed thrifts just presented does not speak
directly to the question of why some thrifts failed while others survived. To
answer this question, we put the data together and constructed table 10.8,
which presents data on the 517 thrifts operating at year-end 1984 for the sub-
sequent four years. These thrifts are classified into four major groups (sol-
vency is as of year-end 1984, according to our measure of market values;
closure is through 31 March 1990, the latest data available at the time this
table was constructed): insolvent and subsequently closed (50 thrifts, 10% of
the 517 in operation at year-end 1984); insolvent and subsequently open (still
operating) (170 thrifts, or 33%); solvent and subsequently closed (22 thrifts,
or 4%); and solvent and subsequently open (275 thrifts, or 53%). To test fur-
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that met the FHLBB's informal definition of adequate solvency had a stronger
incentive to take excessive risks, we subclassified the insolvent thrifts into
those with RAP net worth of over 3 percent (RAP NW > 3%). The twelve
insolvent/RAP>3% thrifts that subsequently closed constitute 24 percent of
the total insolvent and closed group. The 69 open insolvent/RAP>3% thrifts
are 41 percent of the insolvent and open group.
3
4
Table 10.8 shows that the insolvent thrifts are significantly larger than the
solvent thrifts, consistent with table 10.5. However, a striking finding re-
vealed by table 10.8 is that the closed insolvent/RAP>3% group is over twice
as large, on average, than the other insolvent thrifts. The 1987 and 1988 stan-
dard errors of the means are quite large because the data include one small
thrift (total assets of about $35 million) and one very large thrift (with total
assets of $4 billion in 1984 and $10 billion in 1988; the next largest thrift had
$1.6 billion in assets). While this group had few members, they imposed large
cost on the FSLIC.
The costs to the FSLIC (and, largely, to the taxpayers) are indicated by the
negative market-value-to-total-asset percentages. All of the 50 insolvent and
closed thrifts had negative market-value net worth in each year they were op-
erating. However, about half of these thrifts had positive book-value net worth
ratios in 1984, 1985, and 1986. These positive RAP net worth values appear
to explain why the insolvent thrifts were allowed to continue operating. Most
of the 22 solvent thrifts that were closed started their downward slide in 1986.
Five of the 21 institutions still operating in 1986 were closed in 1987, and 4
were closed in 1988.
3
5 Most (over 75 percent) of the year-end 1984 insolvents
that remained open (including those with RAP NW > 3%) became market-
value solvent after 1984, and almost all had positive book-value net worth.
On average, the insolvent thrifts that closed had negative growth rates in all
five years. Although the closed insolvent/RAP>3% groups grew, on average,
in 1985, 1986, and 1987, the maximum annual rate at any of these thrifts did
not exceed 24 percent. Thus, high growth does not appear to have been a
strategy followed by or permitted to insolvent thrifts that were closed. Year-
end 1984 insolvent thrifts that remained open grew, on average, in each year
studied, as did the year-end 1984 solvent thrifts, with one exception. Average
negative growth rates were experienced by the solvent and closed thrifts in
1988. Although this group of thrifts grew at an average rate of 14.0 percent in
1985, this rate is not significantly different from the 13.7 percent rate experi-
enced by the solvent thrifts that were not closed. Thus, growth, as such, does
not appear to be related to initial solvency or closure.
Investment in nontraditional assets (other than first mortgages secured by
1-4 family residential property, commercial and consumer loans, and real es-
tate held for investment) is significantly higher at thrifts that closed than at
thrifts that survived. The closed thrifts also experienced significantly higher
delinquency rates, possibly in association with their high level of nontradi-
tional investment. However, the insolvents did not noticeably increase their349 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
nontraditional investments between 1984 and closure, in contrast to the 22
solvents that closed. These institutions not only began with high levels of
nontraditional assets, but dramatically increased these investments through
1986. The overwhelming type of nontraditional asset held by the 1984
solvent-and-closed group is commercial mortgages, which constitute from
one-half to almost all of the nontraditional assets. Mortgages on multifamily
residential property is the next most popular nontraditional asset. Commercial
loans of between 10 and 15 percent of total assets were held by only five
thrifts; the percentage is less than 4 percent at the rest. Consumer loans are
less than 10 percent of assets at all except four thrifts (one of which had a
quarter of its assets in consumer loans). Few of these thrifts had real estate
held for investment; as a percentage of total assets, only two had as much as 9
percent, one had 7 percent, three had between 1 and 3 percent, and fifteen had
none. The delinquency rates on both mortgage and nonmortgage loans expe-
rienced by the 1984 solvent-and-closed thrifts are higher than those experi-
enced by the other thrifts, substantially so for 1986, 1987, and 1988. Thus,
reasons for the failure or survival of 1984 solvent southeastern thrifts appears
to be poor loan underwriting and possibly regional downturns, and may be
related to deregulation that allowed higher investment in commercial mort-
gages.
Two other factors also appear important. First, 14 of the 22 thrifts (64 per-
cent) were chartered after 1979; six of these (27 percent) were chartered after
1982. Two of these post-1982 thrifts were heavily (over 70 percent) invested
in nontraditional assets. Second, the mean market-value net worth to assets
ratios in 1984 and 1985 for the solvents that closed are 4.2 and 1.3 percent,
compared to the ratios for open solvents of 5.4 and 7.3 percent in those years.
One of the solvent and closed thrifts has a 30.0 percent ratio in 1984, which
declined to 12.6 percent in 1985 and 5.4 percent in 1987, as it grew. With this
newly chartered thrift omitted, the mean ratio for the group at year-end 1984
is 3.0 percent and 1.1 percent at year-end 1985. Thus, although it seems clear
that rapid movement into nontraditional assets was the proximate cause of the
solvent thrifts' failure, these thrifts' newness and net worth weakness may
have been the proximate cause of their undertaking this strategy. It also should
be noted that this group of thrifts are only 4 percent of the total number in the
Southeast operating at year-end 1984.
All of the groups tended to decrease their holdings of fixed-interest-rate 1-
4 family mortgages as percentages of total assets over the period, while in-
creasing their holdings of adjustable-interest-rate mortgages (ARMs). The
largest holdings of ARMs relative to total assets is by the solvent and closed
group. These thrifts may have experienced relatively large delinquency rates
and operating losses because they underwrote large amounts of ARMs with
below-market "teaser" rates without qualifying mortgagors at the higher post-
teaser rates. Unfortunately, the data required to test this hypothesis are not
available.350 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
Passbook deposits, which give rise to the core deposit intangible asset, are
somewhat higher percentages of total liabilities at open than at the closed
thrifts, on average. However, these average only from 5 to 10 percent of total
liabilities. Deposits under $100,000, which average above 70 percent of total
liabilities, are significantly greater at the open compared to the closed thrifts.
These fully insured deposits did not increase as a percentage of total liabilities
at the insolvent thrifts, and decreased at the insolvent/RAP>3% thrifts, which
is inconsistent with the insolvency-incentive, deposit-insurance hypothesis.
Indeed, fully insured deposits on average are highest at the solvent and open
thrifts. Deposits over $100,000 tended to decrease as a percentage of total
liabilities at the closed thrifts (both insolvent and solvent). They were replaced
largely with advances from the Federal Home Loan banks. Finally, brokered
deposits were under 5 percent, on average, for all groups in all years. How-
ever, they were highest among the insolvent/RAP>3%, and solvent and
closed thrifts.
10.5.4 The Behavior of Thrifts that Were Market-Value Insolvent or
Solvent at Year-End 1986 and That Subsequently Were Closed or
Open through 31 March 1990
Many of the thrifts recovered substantially by year-end 1986, as interest
rates declined. Consequently, we calculated the percentages of net worth, as-
sets, and liabilities (presented in table 10.9) for the 496 thrifts still operating
as of year-end 1986. In contrast with the earlier period, 81 percent of the
thrifts were solvent and open (compared to 53 percent at year-end 1984),
while the insolvent and open group decreased from 33 percent to 6 percent.
About the same percentages of thrifts were insolvent and closed (8 compared
to 10 percent in 1984) and solvent and closed (4 percent in both years).
The distribution of total assets among the groups is similar to that found for
the 1984 insolvents: the solvent thrifts are smaller and the largest thrifts are
those that are insolvent/RAP>3%. The total asset growth rates are negative,
on average, for the insolvent and closed thrifts, but are significantly positive
and roughly similar for the other groups. All of the closed insolvent thrifts
remained insolvent until they were closed, while the open insolvents im-
proved their solvency over the years: half are solvent by year-end 1988. A
similar pattern is found for the open and closed insolvent/RAP>3% groups.
On the other hand, three-quarters of the solvents that were closed became
insolvent in 1987 and all but two are insolvent in 1988. However, most of
these thrifts show positive RAP net worth through year-end 1988.
The average percentages of nontraditional assets to total assets are similar
for the 1986 and the 1984 insolvents. The mortgage and nonmortgage delin-
quency rates similarly are significantly higher for the closed than for the open
thrifts. But these rates are not higher for the insolvent/RAP>3% groups or for
the insolvent and open groups compared to the solvent and open groups.
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failure, these data do not provide support for the insolvency-incentive hypoth-
esis. However, of the 19 thrifts that were solvent at year-end 1986 but subse-
quently were closed, 7 (37 percent) were insolvent at year-end 1984, and the
mean market-value net worth to assets of the group at year-end 1986 is 3.4
percent, compared to 6.9 percent for the solvent and open thrifts. Thus, net
worth weakness may have played a role in the investment strategy of the 1986
solvent thrifts that closed.
Over the years 1986 through 1988, the percentage of fixed-interest-rate 1-
4 family mortgages to total assets remained fairly stable, on average, with the
exception of a significant decrease in the solvent and open group (which still
has about the highest percentages). ARMs percentages are similar to those
found for the 1984 insolvencies: lowest for the insolvent/RAP>3% and closed
group, but the differences among the groups are not statistically significant.
Among the liabilities, passbook deposits as a percentage of total liabilities
is significantly higher at the solvent and open groups and insolvent/RAP>3%
and open groups, and somewhat higher at the insolvent and open group,
which may explain, in part, why they were able to survive. As with the year-
end 1984 insolvents, deposits under $100,000 as a percentage of total liabili-
ties is significantly higher at the solvent and open group, which is inconsistent
with the deposit-insurance hypothesis. Deposits over $100,000 as a percent-
age of total liabilities are somewhat higher, on average, at the thrifts that were
closed. However, as table 10.7 shows, these partially insured deposits de-
creased considerably as the thrifts neared closure. Finally, brokered deposits
are a very small percentage of total liabilities (most thrifts had none). The
average percentages are highest for the insolvent/RAP>3% that closed, but
this mean is due to three of the ten in 1986, two in 1987, and one in 1988
(which funded 31 percent of its liabilities with brokered deposits).
10.5.5 Excessive Risk-Taking, Solvency, Type of Ownership, and Change
in Ownership
Risk-taking may take the form of holding a duration-unbalanced portfolio
of financial assets and liabilities, investing in assets with highly variable net
cash flows not offset by cash flows from other assets, or taking excessive
credit risk (as discussed below). These behaviors are hypothesized to be a
function of the market-value solvency of a thrift, an insolvent thrift appearing
to be solvent as measured by its RAP net worth being at least 3 percent of its
assets, whether the thrift is a mutual or stockholder owned, and whether own-
ership or management changed in the recent past.
Interest-Rate Risk
The year-end Freddie Mac commitment rate on thirty-year fixed-interest
first mortgages is 13.4 percent in 1983, 13.1 percent in 1984, 10.8 percent in
1985, 9.3 percent in 1986, 10.6 percent in 1987, and 10.8 percent in 1988.
Thus, the improvement in the solvency of the least-solvent thrifts from 1984355 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
to 1985 shown in table 10.5 may have been the result of these thrifts taking
interest-rate risk from which they benefited when interest rates declined. Al-
though we would have preferred using the duration of the thrifts' portfolios,
these data are not available. Instead, we used the one-year-repricing gap be-
tween assets and liabilities to measure thrifts' propensity toward interest-rate-
risk taking, and assume that this gap is representative of the entire portfolio.
The gap and the independent variables are measured as of the end of a year to
measure ex ante propensity toward taking interest-rate risk. The following
relationship is examined (all variables are taken from year-end financial re-
ports: consequently, the year subscript is omitted):
(5) GAP1 = bJA + b2 NTA + b3 NWM + b4 IN-RAP3%*TA
+ b5 CC*TA + b6 M*TA,
where
GAP I = gap (difference) between the amount of assets and liabili-
ties that are repriced within one year;
TA = total assets at book value, included as a measure of size;
NTA = nontraditional assets (mortgages other than first 1-4 family
loans, commercial and consumer loans, and real estate held
for investment), included to account for relevant assets dif-
ferences, because these assets tend to be interest-rate re-
priced within a year;
NWM = net worth at market value;
IN-RAP3% = (RAP net worth -H total assets at book value = NWR) less
(net worth -r- total assets [multiplied by TA to account for
scale], both at market value = NWM) if NWR > 3% and
NWM < 0%; 0 otherwise;
CC = 1 if there was a change in control in the current year or in
any past year beginning in 1983, the earliest year for which
we have data (multiplied by TA to account for scale); 0
otherwise; and
M = 1 if a mutual (multiplied by TA to account for scale); 0 if
stockholder owned.
The variables in equation (5) were divided by TA to reduce heteroscedasticity,
and the following regression was computed for each of the five years, 1984
through 1988:
(5') GAP1 /TA = bx + b2NTA I TA + b3NWM I TA
+ b4 IN-RAP3% + b5CC + b6 M.
The observations include all thrifts operating during the year, including those
that failed or merged in the following year.
Table 10.10 presents the mean of the dependent variable and the coefficients




































Table 10.10 One-Year Interest-Rate Gap: One-Year-Maturity Assets less Liabilities -5-
Total Assets (in percentages), Coefficients [Probability Coefficient > 0]
Year-end 1984 ^985 1986 ]987 1988
Dependent variable mean -36.4 -23.9 -18.1 -24.1 -20.2
Intercept -43.0 -31.5 -25.1 -36.9 -33.8
[total assets] [<01] [<-01] [<-01] [<-01] [<-01]
Nontraditional -r- total assets at 0.29 0.23 0.19 0.42 0.44
book values, in percentages [<01] [<01] [<01] [<01] [<01]
Net worth H-total assets at mar- 1.10 0.50 0.43 0.82 0.87
ket values, in percentage [<01] [<01] [<-01] [<01] [<01]
RAP NW if > 3% less MV NW
if < 0, percentage of TA; or 0
Change in control, current and
years through 1983
Mutual rather than stock
Adjusted R
2
Number of observations 507 499 487 464 442
Note: All variables measured at year-ends.
zero (in square brackets).
3
6 As expected, the average one-year gap is negative,
indicating that the southeastern thrifts would tend to gain if interest rates de-
clined. The average gap is greatest at year-end 1984—36.4 percent of total
assets. It declined by about one-third in 1985 and then by one-quarter in 1986,
after which it increased to the 1985 level and then declined again in 1988. The
intercept (which is the coefficient of TA) indicates that GAP is approximately
proportionate to the size of the institution, but is not completely due to size
alone. The thrifts' holding of nontraditional assets is significantly related to
their gap throughout the period, indicating that higher levels of these assets
enabled thrifts to reduce their negative gap, and hence their exposure to
interest-rate risk.
Market-value net worth is very significantly positively related to GAP. The
coefficient is largest, by far, in 1984. Thus, it appears that the most insolvent
thrifts tended to take the most interest-rate risk, particularly in 1984. This
finding is consistent with the solvency improvement reported in table 10.5.
However, the insignificant coefficient for IN-RAP3% indicates that this subset
of the insolvent thrifts did not take advantage of their appearance of solvency,
perhaps because the supervisory authorities were not fooled or because the
thrifts' managers expected a rise in rates.
3
7
Perhaps surprisingly, change in control is not reflected in greater interest-
rate-risk taking. The coefficient of mutual-rather-than-stock ("mutual") also is
insignificant in the regression. However, as shown in table 10.11, mutual is
significantly negatively related to nontraditional assets. Furthermore, the
means of GAP1 are significantly more negative at mutuals than at stocks, for357 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
Table 10.11 Nontraditional Assets as a percentage of Total Assets,





Net worth -e- total assets at mar-
ket values, in percentages
RAP NW if > 3% less MV NW
if < 0, percentage of TA; or 0
Change in control, current and
years through 1983

























































aNontraditional assets include mortgages other than first 1-4 family loans, commercial and con-
sumer loans, and real estate held for investment. Nontraditional and total assets at book values.
Independent variables measured as of the beginning of the year.
each year 1984 through 1988. The medians (which is a preferable measure, as
GAP I at some thrifts is positive) also are more negative. These findings are
consistent with the coefficient for mutual reported in tables 10.3 and 10.4,
which indicated that mutuals had significantly greater market-value losses
through 1984 and conforms with conventional wisdom that mutuals tend to be
"portfolio" lenders as opposed to selling off their mortgage production. De-
spite the collinearity between nontraditional and mutual, we included both
variables in equation (5) to estimate the relative importance of each variable
with respect to GAP1. From this equation, it appears that mutuals' taking
greater interest-rate risk is related primarily to their holding relatively lesser
amounts of nontraditional assets, as is shown next.
Investment in Nontraditional Assets
The Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 permitted federally chartered thrifts to
invest in much higher proportions of nontraditional assets—mortgage loans
other than first 1-4 family loans, commercial and consumer loans, and real
estate held for development—than they previously could hold. We seek to
explain the southeastern thrifts' investment in these assets with a regression
similar to equation (5'):
(6) NTA /TA = c, + c2NWMI TA + c3IN-RAP3% + c4CC + c5M;
where the variables are defined as for equations (5) and (5').
The observations include all thrifts operating during the year, including those
that failed or merged in the following year. The mean of the dependent vari-358 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
able, the coefficients calculated, and the probability that the coefficients are
greater than zero for each year, 1985 through 1988, are presented in table
10.11.
The solvency of a thrift (NWM/TA) is significantly negative related to its
holdings of nontraditional assets, on average. Furthermore, the magnitude of
the relationship in 1986 is more than twice that in 1985. However, the magni-
tudes are small. The coefficients of NWM/TA indicate that a $100 decrease in
net worth is associated with a $28 increase in nontraditional assets in the be-
ginning of 1985, $68 in 1986, $65 in 1987, and $36 in 1988. The coefficient
of IN-RAP 3% is significantly negative except in 1988, indicating that these
institutions tended to invest less in nontraditional assets as the difference be-
tween market and RAP net worth widened, cet. par.
Change of control does not appear related to investment in nontraditional
assets. Mutuals, though, tended to invest significantly less in nontraditional
assets than stocks. This finding is consistent with mutuals taking more
interest-rate risk through traditional mortgage lending, as we report above.
Excessive Credit Risk
In the absence of federal deposit insurance, the risk-neutral managers and
owners of a wealth-maximizing thrift would lend funds such that the present
value of the expected net cash flows was positive. For such decision makers,
risk taken ex ante is not excessive. However, deposit insurance, unless priced
to reflect the insurance agency's risk, gives thrifts an incentive to make loans
and investments with greater variances of expected cash flows. The owners of
stocks and managers of mutuals have a put option to the FSLIC that increases
in value as market-value net worth approaches zero and as the variance of cash
flows increases. In particular, thrifts with zero or negative net worth have
nothing to lose from taking risks. Consequently, they can gain from investing
in high-variance assets that have negative expected present values. Alterna-
tively, thrifts could hold assets on which credit losses are expected, but be
compensated in the form of up-front fees and higher interest rates.
3
8 We con-
sider this possibility in the following section.
We do not have data on the ex ante expected cash flows from loans made by
thrifts. We indirectly test the hypothesis that thrifts tended to take excessive
risks by regressing the year-end delinquency rate on mortgages (and, sepa-
rately, on nonmortgages—commercial and consumer loans) on variables mea-
suring their solvency, change in control, stock versus mutual ownership, and
variables designed to account for relevant exogenous and endogenous factors,
all measured at the beginning of the year:
(7) DELMt = d0 + dxMT,_x + d2MT]_x + d3 1-4FM, + dA E&EPst * MTt_x + d5 NWMt_x + d6 IN-RAP3%t_x * MTt_x + dn CCt_x * MTt_ + d,Mt_x*MTt_x,359 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
where
DELMt = delinquencies on mortgages in total at time t;
MT!_i = mortgages in total at time t — 1;
l-4FMt_j = 1 to 4 family residential mortgages at time t — 1;
AREPst = change in an index of real estate prices in state s during time
t, in percentages; and the other variables are defined as for
equations (5) and (5').
Total mortgages (MT) is included as a variable to account for the expected
positive relationship between loans and the delinquencies on those loans. The
square of MT is included to test the hypothesis that the relationship is not
linear, perhaps because of economies of scale in originating and monitoring
mortgages. The 1-4FM variable is included to test the hypothesis that tradi-
tional mortgages are less risky than other types of mortgages. Alternatively,
1-4FM includes ARMs, on which greater delinquencies may have been ex-
perienced if thrifts wrote mortgages with low "teaser" rates that became delin-
quent when, subsequently, interest rates increased. hREP is included in the
regression to account for exogenous changes in real estate prices, as these
could affect delinquencies. We had to use statewide indexes that were as-
signed to thrifts according to the location of their home office, even though
thrifts often hold mortgages on out-of-state property.
3
9 MEP, IN-RAP3%,
CC, and M are multiplied by MT because their effect on delinquencies should
be proportional to the amount of mortgages held by a thrift. The independent
variables are taken as of the beginning of the period, because they are de-
signed to predict the delinquencies that occur by the end of the period. This
procedure does not capture delinquencies on loans made as a result of, say,
low market-value net worth in one year that become delinquent in a subse-
quent year. However, the data presented in tables 10.7, 10.8, and 10.9 indi-
cate that delinquencies tend to increase in the year after a thrift becomes very
insolvent. Furthermore, a thrift that is insolvent in one year usually is insol-
vent or very weak in preceding years; hence, a thrift's solvency in one year is
a proxy for its solvency in previous years.
As is done similarly for other relationships, the variables are divided by
TMt to reduce heteroscedasticity. Consequently, equation (7') was estimated:
(7') DELM, I TMt_x = d0 I TMt_x + dx + d2 MT,_l + d^l~4FMt_x ITMt_x
+ d4 &REPst + d5 NWMt_x I TMt_x + d6IN-RAP3%,_x + dyCC,_x+ d8Mt_x.
The mean of the dependent variable, the coefficients calculated, and the prob-
ability that the coefficients are greater than zero for each year, 1985 through
1988, are presented in table 10.12. Before discussing the findings, we should
note that delinquencies at year-end are not a complete measure of loan losses,360 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
Table 10.12 Mortgage Delinquencies as Percentage of Total Mortgages Regressed
On Market-Value Net Worth and Other Variables, Coefficients
[Probability Coefficient > 0]'
Year-end
Dependent variable (mortgage






1-4 Family mortgages as
percentage of total mortgages
Real estate price index (statewide),
percentage change
Market-value net worth as
percentage of total mortgages
RAP NW if > 3% less MV NW if
< 0, percentage of TA; or 0
Change in control, current and
years through 1983
Mutual rather than stock





























































































"Independent variables measured as of the beginning of the year.
even if delinquencies equal expected loan losses, as we assume. Not included
in this measure are loans written off as uncollectible during the year. In addi-
tion, as we note above, offsetting income and operating expenses, which are
trade-offs for loan losses, are not included in the dependent variable.
As expected, mortgage delinquencies are significantly positively related to
mortgages. However, the greater magnitude of the coefficients compared to
the mean of the dependent variable indicates that other factors mitigate this
relationship. In 1987 and 1988, one mitigating factor is the amount of mort-
gages; the negative sign on d2 (the coefficient of total mortgages, TM, in equa-
tion [7'], which is the square of TM in the basic equation [7]) indicates econ-
omies of scale with respect to delinquencies, at least for those years. One-to-
four family residential mortgages appear to have significantly lower delin-
quencies, cet. par. The change in the index of real estate prices (AREP) has
significant negative coefficients in all years. Thus, it appears that exogenous
factors played a role in a thrift's absorbing credit losses (which we measure
with delinquencies).
The coefficients of market-value net worth are significantly negative, indi-361 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
eating that the greater a thrift's solvency, the less likely it was to have credit
losses. However, the magnitude of the coefficients are small; a 1 percent de-
crease in net worth is associated, on the average, with at most a 0.22 percent-
age point increase in mortgage delinquencies, which is less than 10 percent of
the mean amount of delinquencies. The variable designed to measure a partic-
ular propensity toward excessive risk-taking, IN-RAP3%, has very insignifi-
cant coefficients in all years except 1987, when it has an unexpected negative
sign.
Prior change in control is not significantly related to mortgage delinquen-
cies, except for 1987, when there is a strong positive significant relationship.
Mutuals have significantly lower delinquencies than stockholder-owned
thrifts, on average.
We computed a similar set of regressions for delinquencies on nonmortgage
(commercial and consumer) loans. The adjusted R squares ranged from zero
to two percent. None of the variables was consistently statistically significant,
with the exception of the amount of nonmortgage loans, where the coefficients
are very close in magnitude to the means of the dependent variable. (The
means of nonmortgage delinquencies as a percentage of delinquencies are
1.92 in 1985, 2.48 in 1986, 2.25 in 1987, and 2.48 in 1988.) The only other
variable with a statistically significant coefficient is stock versus mutual own-
ership, where mutuals had significantly lower delinquencies than stocks in
1985 and 1986 (1.00 and 1.90 percentage points lower, on average), and
lower delinquencies on consumer than on commercial loans in all years except
1988.
As noted above, delinquencies are not a sufficient measure of excessive
risk-taking. Thrifts that experience high delinquency ratios could have been
compensated with commensurately higher fees and interest payments. They
also could have incurred lesser amounts of operating expenses and accepted
greater amounts of delinquencies. In addition, loans written off during the
year were not considered. Consequently, we turn now to an analysis of thrifts'
net profits, which should summarize the joint effects of credit losses, income,
and operating expenses.
10.5.6 The Determinants of Market-Value Net Profits
The ultimate measure of whether investment in deregulated assets, deposits
acquired through brokers, change of control, and type of ownership strength-
ened or weakened thrifts is the net gain or loss in their market-value net worth.
We measure this gain or loss by the change in the market value of net worth
adjusted for dividends and additional capital investments. This measure is
superior to accounting net profits, which do not include gains and losses from
changes in market values. However, it suffers (as does GAAP) from being an
ex post measure. Unexpected changes in interest rates are reflected in changes
in market-value net profit, and thus this variable can have more to do with
whether thrifts took interest-rate risk and won or lost the gamble than with
whether they were well or badly operated. We deal with this problem by com-362 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
puting market-value net profit over years in which interest rates were rela-
tively stable.
Investment in Deregulated Assets and Other Factors
We consider first the effect on market-value net profit of thrifts' investment
in traditional residential mortgages (TM, which includes mortgage-backed se-
curities) and nontraditional assets (NTA, which includes mortgages other than
1-4 family loans, commercial and consumer loans, and real estate held for
investment). Variables representing the source of funds, such as brokered and
over $100,000 (jumbo) deposits, are not included in this analysis (they are
considered below). To the extent that funding sources are associated with tra-
ditional or nontraditional mortgages, the net profit advantage or disadvantage
should accrue to that investment. In addition, we consider the effect on net
profits of ownership type and change in control, as well as propensity toward
risk-taking, as measured by IN-RAP3%. Net profits also are affected by ex-
ogenous factors, particularly unexpected changes in real estate prices, which
we measure as the percentage change of an index of real estate prices by state
(MEPs).
We examine the following relationship:
(8) MVNP, = b0 + bx TM,_X + b2NTA,_x, + b3 \REPst * TA,_X + b4 IN-RAP3% * TA,_X + b5 CC, * TA,_X, b6 M, * TA,_X,
where
MVNP, = market-value net profit, the change in the market value of
equity adjusted for dividends and additional capital invest-
ments through time t;
TM,_, = traditional residential mortgages (including mortgage-backed
securities) at market value at the beginning of period t; and the
other variables are as defined for equations (5) and (7).
Total assets is not included in the regression because traditional mortgages
and nontraditional assets constitute almost all of most thrifts' total assets.
Consequently, the coefficients estimated for these variables include the effects
on net profits of other, nonspecified assets (as well as liabilities) that are cor-
related with traditional mortgages and nontraditional assets. To reduce heter-
oscedasticity, the variables are divided by total assets at book value (TA) at the
beginning of the period (time t — 1), and the following regression was run for
years 1985 through 1988, individually:
(8') MVNP, ITA ,_x = bj TA,_X + bx TM,_X I TA,_X
+ b2NTA,_xITA,_x
+ b, &REP,/TA,_X
+ b4 IN-RAP 3% + b5 CC, + b6M,.363 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
The observations include all thrifts operating during a year, including those
that failed or merged in the following year, with the exception of eight thrifts
not identified by location. Because market-value net profit is measured over a
year, we can include only 1985 through 1988. To account for the possibility
that a single year's net profit is subject to noise, we also measure market-value
net profit averaged over two-year periods, 1985-86 and 1987-88.
4
0 The
means of the dependent variable, the coefficients calculated, and the probabil-
ity that the coefficients are greater than zero are presented in table 10.13.
The average market-value net profit per dollar of book-value assets, shown
by the mean of the dependent variable, exhibits considerable change over the
years studied. In 1985 the average profit rate is 3.24 percent. It then declines
to 0.17 percent in 1986, -1.16 percent in 1987, and - 0.77 percent in 1988.
The large profits in 1985 are due to that year's decrease in interest rates.
Table 10.13 Market-Value Net Profit as a Percentage of Total Assets Regressed On
Traditional Mortgages, Nontraditional Assets, and Other Variables,
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RAP NW if > 3% less
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"Market-value net profit = change in market-value net worth plus dividends less additional investments.
Traditional mortgages = 1-4 family first mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, at book value.
Nontraditional mortgages = other mortgages, commercial, and consumer loans, and real estate held for
investment, at book value. Independent variables measured as of the beginning of the year.
bIn thousands of dollars.364 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
The regressions indicate that traditional mortgages are significantly posi-
tively related to market-value net profit in 1985 and 1986, negatively and sig-
nificantly in 1988, and insignificantly negatively in 1987. This finding is ver-
ified by the two-year regressions (1985-86 and 1987-88). It also is consistent
with the one-year GAPs reported in table 10.10, which show a greater nega-
tive gap at year-end 1984 than at the other year-ends, and with the observation
that interest rates decreased through the first quarter of 1987. Thus, there is
reason to believe that the greater profitability of traditional mortgages in 1985
and, to a lesser extent, in 1986 is due to thrifts with traditional mortgages
(that tend to be fixed interest in 1984 and 1985, see tables 10.5, 10.8, and
10.9) winning an interest-rate-change gamble in those years, and losing it in
1987 and 1988.
Nontraditional assets are significantly negatively associated with annual
market-value net profit in all years. On average, southeastern thrifts annually
lost 4 to 7 percent of their investment in nontraditional assets. Over the two-
year periods studied, the loss averages 6 and 5 percent.
A positive relationship between market-value net worth and market-value
net profit is expected because the factor cost of capital is not recorded as an
expense. The coefficients' market-value net worth is positive and statistically
significant for 1987 and 1988, indicating that additional net worth yielded 9
percent, on average. However, the coefficient is negative and statistically sig-
nificant for 1985. This finding appears due to the weaker thrifts having won
their interest-rate-risk gamble in that year. The coefficients of the IN-RAP3%
variable are positive and significant for all years except 1986. This finding is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that these thrifts tended to make negative-
value investments.
Change in control has a significant negative coefficient for 1987 and the
two-year 1987-88 period; for the other years, the coefficients are very insig-
nificant. Thus, there is only some evidence supporting the hypothesis that a
change in control is detrimental to the deposit insurance fund. Mutuals had
significantly higher net profits than stocks, particularly in 1985 and 1986.
This finding is consistent with their taking greater interest-rate risk (as re-
ported in table 10.10) and holding relatively less nontraditional assets (as re-
ported in table 10.11). The mutuals also may obtain higher market-value net
profits because they tend to be located in less competitive markets, as reported
by Carhill and Hasan (1990). Finally, the change in real estate prices (hREP)
is significantly positively related to market-value net profits in all years.
Insured-Deposit Growth and Brokered Deposits and Other Factors
It is alleged that thrifts took advantage of the increase in deposit insurance
coverage from $40,000 to $100,000 per account in 1980 and removal of
interest-rate ceilings on deposits in the following years to acquire interest-
rate-sensitive funds that were invested in risky projects. An alternative to
growth with fully insured deposits is growth with deposits over $100,000.
These deposits often carry a premium because they are only partially insured365 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
by the FSLIC, and hence should result in lower net profits, cet. par. Another
alternative considered particularly pernicious by the supervisory authorities is
growth by means of brokered deposits.
We related the growth of thrifts' assets between mid-year 1982 and year-
end 1984 to their market-value net worths at year-end 1984 (see tables 10.4
and 10.6). The regression coefficients and summary statistics reported are in-
consistent with the hypothesis that insolvent thrifts grew more rapidly than
solvent thrifts. If anything, the contrary appears to have occurred.
We now examine the relationship between the change in insured, partially
insured, and brokered deposits and the thrifts' market-value net profits since
1984. For this purpose, we specified the following relationship:
(9) MVNP, = b0 + bx AID,_X + b2 APID,_X
+ b, ABD, + b4 NWM,_X * TA,_X
+ b5 IN-RAP 3% *TA,_X
+ bf. M, *IA, , + bn CC, * I A, .,
where
AID = change in insured (under $100,000) deposits;
APID = change in partially insured (over $100,000) deposits;
ABD = change in brokered deposits; and the other variables are defined
as for equation (5).
Total assets (TA) is not included in this relationship because the sum of the
deposits almost equals total assets. As is done earlier, all the variables are
divided by TA, and we calculated the following regression for each year and
for two-year average net profits:
(9') MVNP, I TA,_X = bQ\ I TA,_X + bx A1D,_{ I TA,_X
+ b2 APID,_X I TA,_X + b3 ABD, I TA,_X
+ b4NWM,_x + b5IN-RAP3% + b6M, + b7CCr
Table 10.14 gives the coefficients and other statistics estimated from equa-
tion (9'). The coefficients for the change in fully insured deposits (deposits
under $100,000) are significantly positive for 1988 and the two-year period
1987-88, and not significant for the other years. The coefficients estimated
also are very small. This finding indicates that thrifts that increased their fund-
ing through fully insured deposits experienced trivial market-value net gains.
The coefficients for the change in partially insured deposits (over $100,000)
are positive and statistically significant for all years. This source of deposits
is associated with market-value net profits. It may be that partially insured
depositors sought out better-managed thrifts or that better-managed thrifts
were able to attract partially insured deposits.
The coefficients on the change in brokered deposits are negative and signif-
icant only for 1988 and for the two-year period 1987-88; in the other years
the coefficients are insignificant. On balance, the change in brokered deposits366 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
Table 10.14 Market-Value Net Profit as a Percentage of Total Assets Regressed On
Deposits and Other Variables, Coefficients (Probability Coefficient > 0]*
Year-end
Dependent variable (net
profit as a percentage
of total assets): mean
Change in deposits of
< $100,000 as a per-
centage of assets
Change in deposits of
> $100,000 as a per-
centage of assets
Change in brokered de-
posits as a percentage
of assets
Net worth -r total assets
at market value, in
percentages
RAP NW if > 3% less
MV NW if < 0, per-
centage of TA; or 0
Change in control, cur-
rent and years through
1983
Mutual rather than stock






























































































































"Market-value net profit = change in market-value net worth plus dividends less additional investments.
Independent variables measured as of the beginning of the period.
bIn thousands of dollars.
seems to be weakly associated with lower market-value net profits and may
reflect a reduced capacity to fund through local deposits.
The coefficients of market-value net worth, IN-RAP3%, change in control,
and mutual rather than stock variables are similar in this regression as in the
regression with asset values rather than deposits (equation [8']), with one ex-
ception. The mutual-rather-than-stock dummy variable has an insignificant
coefficient in 1985 when deposits are the other independent variables, but a
significantly positive coefficient when assets are the other independent vari-
ables.
10.5.7 Deposit Growth and Solvency
We further test the "deposit-insurance" hypothesis by examining the rela-
tionship between the change in thrifts' deposits over a year and their market-367 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
value net worth at the beginning of a year. The following relationships are
specified:
(10a) AID, = bx AWM,_, + b2 IN-RAP3% *TAt_x
+ b5CC,*TA,_x + b6M,*TA,_x,
and
(10b) APID, = bx NWM,_X + b2 IN-RAP3% * TAt_x
+ b5CCt*TAt_x + b6Mt*TA,_x,
where the variables are as defined for equation (9) above.
All variables were divided by TAt_, before calculations were made, and the
following regressions were calculated:
(10a
;) AID, I TA,_l = bx NWM,_} I TAt_l + b2 IN-RAP3%,_1
+ b5 CC, + b6 M,,
and
(10b') APID, I TA,_l = b, NWM,_, + b2 IN-RAP3% * TAt_,
+ b5CC + b6 M,.
The means of the dependent variables, the coefficients estimated, and the
probability that the coefficients are greater than zero are given in table 10.15.
The change in fully insured deposits averages 10.2 percent in 1985, but
then drops to 3.0 percent in 1986, and becomes so small as to be insignificant
in 1987 and 1988. The coefficient estimated for market-value net worth in
1985 is positive, significant, and large, indicating that growth in insured de-
posits was greatest at the more solvent thrifts. The coefficients are significant
but much smaller and positive in 1986, and negative in 1987 and 1988. With
respect to partially insured deposits, the coefficient for 1985 indicates that the
more solvent thrifts tended not to grow with deposits over $100,000 in 1985,
but did use these deposits in the other years. However, the coefficients are
small in magnitude, though statistically significant. The coefficients in IN-
RAP3% are insignificant for both kinds of deposits, except for 1985 fully
insured deposits. The significant positive coefficient and large magnitude
gives some evidence that these thrifts took advantage of deposit insurance to
grow in that year. Thereafter, their growth may have been restrained by the
supervisory authorities.
Change in control is positively associated with deposit growth, but the re-
lationship is statistically significant only in 1988 for fully insured deposits and
in 1986 for partially insured deposits. Mutuals had a significantly lesser pro-
pensity than stocks to grow with fully insured deposits in all years, and a
positive (though lesser) propensity to grow with partially insured deposits
than stocks in all years. This finding is consistent with stocks offering more
risk to depositors.368 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
Table 10.15 Change in Deposits as a Percentage of Total Assets Regressed On
Market-Value Net Worth and Other Variables, Coefficients
[Probability Coefficient > 0]"
Year-end
A. Fully Insured Deposits (under $100,000)
Dependent variable (percentage change
in deposits to total assets): mean
Net worth H- total assets at market
value, in percentages [
RAP NW if > 3% less MV NW if
< 0, percentage of TA; or 0
Change in control, current and years
through 1983


















































































2 0.46 0.16 0.14 0.14
[<.01] [<01] [<01] [<01]
B. Partially Insured Deposits (over $100,000)
Dependent variable (percentage change
in deposits to total assets): mean
Net worth -H total assets at market
value, in percentages
RAP NW if > 3% less MV NW if
< 0, percentage of TA; or 0
Change in control, current and years
through 1983




independent variables measured as of the beginning of the period.
10.6 Implications of the Analysis for the Hypotheses
1. Unbalanced Durations of Assets and Liabilities—Interest-Rate Risk
The losses measured for thrifts operating at year-end 1984 indicate that the
increase in interest rates in the preceding years was responsible for a large
portion of their losses. Over this period, we estimate that the southeastern
thrifts lost 5.3 percent of their assets, or $8,078 million. Over three-quarter of
the institutions suffered reductions in net worth that were not recorded accord-
ing to RAP. Not surprisingly, most of the decline was due to mortgages, pre-
dominantly on 1-4 family homes. These losses were offset, somewhat, by
increases in the value of the thrifts' core-deposit intangible asset related to
their passbook-deposit liabilities. (See table 10.2 for details.) We regressed
the change in net worth on total assets, total assets squared, state location369 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
of the thrifts, and on their mutual or stock form of ownership (see table 10.3).
The net worth change and amount of market-value net worth also was re-
gressed on these variables (except state), on the mid-year 1982 amounts of
book-value net worth, passbook deposits, and 1-4 family mortgages, and on
growth in assets over the period (see tables 10.4 and 10.6). The larger thrifts
suffered the greatest losses. Mutuals had significantly greater losses than
stocks. Losses in net worth and lower amounts of market-value net worth are
significantly associated with low initial book-value net worth and low pass-
book deposits. Perhaps surprisingly, asset growth is slightly associated with
lesser losses and higher levels of market-value net worth.
As we show in section 10.7, interest-rate-induced losses dominate the
losses through 1984 taken by southeastern thrifts. Despite these losses, only
31 of the 517 thrifts operating at year-end 1984 were closed (another 31 vol-
untarily merged with other institutions).
Additional interest-rate declines in 1985 and 1986 reduced the thrifts' in-
solvency considerably. On average, the 1984 insolvent thrifts that were oper-
ating through year-end 1988 became solvent in 1985 and 1986 (see table
10.5). However, not included in these numbers are 31 thrifts that failed
through year-end 1988. All but one of these that failed in 1985 and 1986 were
market-value insolvent at year-end 1984, as were slightly over half of those
that failed in 1987 and 1988 (see table 10.7).
2. Excessive Risk-Taking By Economically Insolvent and Weak Thrifts
The data support the hypothesis that many thrifts' pre-1984 insolvency and
later solvency are related to interest-rate risk-taking, particularly in 1985 (see
table 10.10). Indeed, as we discuss above, this appears to be the principal
reason that insolvent operating thrifts became solvent, on average, in 1985
and 1986.
However, the data strongly reject the hypothesis that insolvent thrifts grew
more than solvent thrifts between mid-year 1982 (just before passage of the
Garn-St Germain Act) and year-end 1984. Nor is growth in assets after 1984
a function of the market-value net worth of the thrifts. To the contrary, the
most insolvent thrifts, including those that failed, grew at a slower rate than
the solvent ones.
Most of the data studied also do not support the hypothesis that insolvent
thrifts increased their investment in nontraditional assets (mortgages other
than 1-4 family first mortgages, commercial and consumer loans, and real
estate held for investment) in an effort to gamble their way to solvency. At
year-end 1984, the insolvent thrifts held somewhat higher percentages of mul-
tifamily and nonresidential mortgages to total assets than did solvent thrifts.
Very low percentages of commercial loans and trivial amounts of real estate
held for investment were on the books of any southeastern thrifts. Consumer
loans were slightly higher at the most insolvent thrifts. The growth in these
nontraditional assets, though, is similar at thrifts grouped according to the370 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
ratios of net worth to assets, measured as market values (see tables 10.5 and
10.8). This conclusion also holds when insolvency is measured at year-end
1986 (see table 10.9). Regressions of nontraditional assets on market-value
net worth (and other variables) using data from all thrifts operating in a partic-
ular year reveals significant negative coefficients, but the magnitudes are
small.
Regressions of the annual change in fully insured deposits on market-value
net worth shows a large, significant positive relationship (see table 10.15). No
such relationship is found for the change in partially insured deposits (over
$100,000). Nor are brokered deposits related to thrifts' market-value net
worth or subsequent failure.
Delinquency rates on mortgages are not higher at the 1984 continuously
operating insolvent thrifts over the years studied than at the solvent ones; de-
linquencies on other loans, though, are somewhat higher for the most insol-
vent group (see table 10.5). The failed thrifts, most of which were insolvent
at year-end 1984, had considerably greater delinquencies after 1985, particu-
larly on mortgage loans. Regressions of mortgage delinquencies on market-
value net worth using data from all thrifts operating in a particular year also
find a significant negative relationship (see table 10.12), which supports the
tabular data showing higher delinquencies at the insolvent thrifts that were
closed. Thus, although the insolvent thrifts did not hold higher amounts of
nontraditional assets, those assets they held appear to have been riskier (as
measured by delinquencies) than those held by more solvent thrifts.
The net effect of the actions taken by and the impact of events on thrifts is
their net profit or loss. We measured this change in wealth as the change in the
market-value of net worth adjusted for dividends and new investments. Re-
gressions of this variable on market-value net worth at the beginning of a year
or two-year period show significant though small positive relationships for
1986, 1987, and 1988 (see tables 10.13 and 10.14). Thus, it appears that
insolvent thrifts did not, on average, take actions that resulted in net losses.
This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis.
3. Overspecialization in Mortgage Loans—Insufficient Diversification and
Declines in Economic Conditions
We were able to test this hypothesis only with a statewide index of real
estate prices. Changes in the index are significantly negatively related to de-
linquencies in 1986, 1987, and 1988 (see table 10.12). The real estate index
change is not significantly related to market-value net profit, though. Assum-
ing that this latter result is not due to the crude nature of the variable, the
experience of the southeastern thrifts in the period studied does not support
this hypothesis.
We were not able to relate directly the 1986 change in the income tax statute
to losses incurred by thrifts. Delinquencies on mortgages increased substan-
tially in 1987 and 1988 among the continuously operating thrifts (see table371 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
10.5) and at the thrifts that failed in 1988. However, delinquencies also were
high at the failed thrifts in 1986 and 1985, and increased on nonmortgage
loans in 1987 and 1988 (see table 10.7). Thus, the data only support the need
for further study.
4. Deposit Insurance and the Removal of Interest-Rate Ceilings on
Savings Deposits
As we note above, growth in assets both before and since 1984 is not related
to the solvency of the thrifts studied. We examined the data more closely by
regressing the change in fully and partially insured deposits on market-value
net worth and other variables. A large significant positive relationship was
found for fully insured deposits in 1985 and a small positive significant rela-
tionship in 1986 (see table 10.15). But small negative significant relationships
between the change in insured deposits and solvency were found for 1987 and
1988. A small significant negative relationship between partially insured de-
posits (over $100,000) and solvency was found for 1985, and small significant
positive relationships for the other years. The change in partially insured de-
posits is significantly positively related to market-value net worth, which in-
dicates that the more-solvent thrifts were able to attract such funds and put
them to good use.
On the whole, the data do not support the hypothesis, at least for the period
studied. By mid-year 1982, at least, the supervisory authorities may have con-
strained opportunistic behavior by insolvent thrifts or the thrifts' managers
may not have attempted such behavior, on average. However, it is clear that
without deposit insurance the thrifts rendered insolvent by interest-rate in-
creases would not have been able to remain open and to obtain additional
deposits. Indeed, absent deposit insurance, thrifts may not have been struc-
tured so as to be exposed to interest-rate risk.
5. Deregulation of Asset Investments and Brokered Deposits
The findings discussed above for the "excessive risk-taking by insolvent
thrifts" hypothesis do not indicate an inverse relationship between thrifts' sol-
vency and growth in their investment in deregulated assets, which also is in-
consistent with the "deregulation of assets" hypothesis. However, a negative
relationship is revealed between holdings of nontraditional assets and market-
value net profits annually averaging 5 to 6 percent of nontraditional assets.
Thrifts that were solvent at year-end 1984 and that subsequently were closed
(4 percent of the sample) had substantially higher investments in nontradi-
tional assets than other thrifts in 1984 that increased considerably in 1985,
although those that were insolvent and closed or remained open did not (see
tables 10.8 and 10.9). Thus, the evidence is mixed. Delinquencies are impor-
tantly related to a thrifts' solvency (particularly among those that were
closed), and differences in thrifts' asset choices appear sufficient to explain
variations in delinquency rates. It should be noted, though, that thrifts ren-372 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
dered insolvent by interest-rate increases did not grow more since mid-year
1982 than solvent thrifts (see tables 10.4 and 10.6). Thus, on average, insol-
vent thrifts did not or were not permitted to use the deregulation of interest
rates for deposit growth to fund excessively risky assets.
Brokered deposits are a somewhat larger percentage of total liabilities at
closed thrifts (see tables 10.8 and 10.9). However, a detailed analysis of these
thrifts reveals that this average is due to a few institutions only (see table
10.7). A significant inverse relationship between the change in brokered de-
posits and market-value net profits was found only for 1988. Thus, it does not
appear that brokered deposits played much of a role at southeastern thrifts.
On the whole, we conclude that the southeastern thrifts' failures are primar-
ily due to the damage done by the high interest rates of the early 1980s; most
of the failures in the late 1980s were thrifts that became insolvent during the
early 1980s. At most, 30 percent of the Southeast's 1985-through-first-
quarter-1989 failures (22 of 72) survived the sharp interest-rate increases with
their solvency intact, but then lost heavily by investing in deregulated assets.
We have reason to suspect that many of these 22 may have actually been in-
solvent prior to 1984, but gained the appearance of solvency because our
market-value model overstates the present value of high interest-rate loans
when delinquencies are delayed or underreported. Furthermore, 64 percent of
the 22 thrifts were newly chartered, which may have contributed to their fail-
ure. Thus, while we can estimate an upper limit on the percentage of the
Southeast's failures caused by deregulated-asset investments, we cannot pre-
clude the possibility that almost all failures in fact were caused by the 1979-
81 interest-rate run up or the difficulties faced by newly chartered thrifts in the
following years.
6. Risk Aversion and Preference of Mutual Compared to Stock Thrifts
Mutual thrifts incurred significantly larger interest-rate-increase-induced
losses through 1984 than did stocks (see tables 10.3 and 10.4) and had larger
negative one-year maturity gaps at year-end 1984, which subjected them to
additional interest risk. When interest rates decreased in 1985 and 1986, mu-
tual thrifts benefited. Mutuals tended to hold lower proportions of nontradi-
tional assets to total assets (see table 10.11) and had lower delinquencies (see
table 10.12). They also obtained lower amounts of fully insured deposits and
slightly higher amounts of partially insured deposits than did stock thrifts, cet.
par. (see table 10.15). On balance, in the period studied, this strategy appar-
ently resulted in their having higher market-value net profits in 1986, 1987,
and 1988, and possibly in 1985 (see tables 10.13 and 10.14).
The data studied are consistent with the conclusion that mutuals tend to
hold traditional assets and are more conservative than stocks, a strategy that
benefits them when interest rates do not increase unexpectedly, as they did
before 1982, or decrease unexpectedly, as they did in 1985 and 1986.373 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
7. Fraud, Self-Dealing, Incompetence, and Inadequate Supervision
Change in control is alleged as a source of thrift failures, particularly ones
that impose considerable costs on the deposit insurance fund. We tested this
hypothesis by including in relevant regressions a dummy variable measuring
a change in ownership or senior management in 1983 and subsequent years.
The coefficient of this variable is insignificant with respect to interest-rate risk
as measured by the one-year gap (see table 10.10), holdings of nontraditional
assets (see table 10.11), mortgage delinquencies (see table 10.12), market-
value net profit (see tables 10.13 and 10.14), and change in deposits (see table
10.15), with a few exceptions. The exceptions are a significant positive rela-
tionship with delinquencies in 1987, the change in fully insured deposits in
1988, and the change in partially insured deposits in 1986, and a significant
negative relationship to market-value net profit in 1987.
We could not test the inadequate supervision hypothesis directly. However,
insolvent thrifts tended to grow less than the solvent thrifts and did not invest
excessively in nontraditional assets. These findings are consistent with the
conclusion that the supervisory authorities in District 4 were diligent in pre-
venting market-value insolvent thrifts, on average, from taking excessively
large risks, thereby imposing higher costs on the FSLIC.
10.7 Failure and Survival
Failure for thrifts may be defined in two ways. One is economic insolvency,
the other is closure or involuntary merger by the supervisory authorities. We
used both definitions. A comparison of the 455 thrifts that were not closed
from year-end 1984 through year-end 1988 with those that were closed during
this period (see tables 10.5 and 10.7) reveals that, on average, the closed
thrifts were significantly insolvent at the beginning of the period and in every
year until closure. The thrifts that were insolvent at year-end 1984 had signif-
icantly lower book-value net worths and lower amounts of passbook deposits
and somewhat higher amounts of 1-4 family mortgages (all relative to assets)
as of mid-year 1982 than did solvent thrifts (see tables 10.4 and 10.6). The
1987 and 1988 closed thrifts also incurred or recognized large losses from
delinquencies in the year before they were closed, which no doubt increased
the FSLIC's costs. They had higher levels of adjustable-interest-rate mort-
gages and were larger than the operating thrifts. They held about the same
proportions of traditional mortgages. Thus, their principal distinction was ini-
tial insolvency and subsequent large credit losses.
We studied the thrifts additionally by examining financial ratios for those
that were solvent or insolvent at year-end 1984 and that were closed or open
through 31 March 1990, the latest date we could use (see table 10.8). We also
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percent—to determine if thrifts that met the FHLBB's informal definition of
financial strength behaved differently from other insolvent thrifts. All the
thrifts operating at year-end 1984 are included in this analysis, even though
some ceased independent operations because of closure or voluntary mergers.
The insolvent thrifts with RAP net worth above 3 percent (IN-RAP3%) that
were closed are substantially larger than the other thrifts. As noted above,
they did not appear to engage in opportunistic behavior; they did not grow
more or invest more heavily in nontraditional assets, although they did obtain
funds through brokers somewhat more than did the other thrifts.
The principal differences between the insolvent thrifts that were closed
compared to insolvents that survived is substantially lower rates of growth
(the failure thrifts declined in size, on average), higher proportions of nontra-
ditional to total assets, lower initial (1984-85) fixed-interest-rate mortgages
to total assets, lower later (1986-88) adjustable-rate mortgages to total assets,
higher delinquency rates, slightly lower proportions of passbook deposits and
fully insured deposits, and higher (though still small) relative amounts of bro-
kered deposits. A comparison of 1984 solvent thrifts that were closed with
those that survived reveals considerably larger proportions of nontraditional
assets and adjustable-rate mortgages, much higher delinquency rates, about
half the proportion of passbook deposits, substantially more brokered depos-
its, and much heavier reliance on deposits over $100,000 (at least in the years
before they were closed).
Because the thrifts' solvency improved dramatically in 1985 and 1986 (see
table 10.5), we examined the 1986, 1987, and 1988 financial ratios of those
that still were insolvent at year-end 1986 (see table 10.9). The picture found
for the 1984 insolvents is very similar, except that the insolvent thrifts that
were not closed were, on average, still insolvent through year-end 1988.
These probably represent losses to the deposit insurance fund (now the tax-
payers). The relatively few thrifts that were solvent at year-end 1986 but sub-
sequently closed (19, or 4 percent of the total number) had much higher pro-
portions of nontraditional assets and delinquencies than the thrifts that
remained open.
Hence, we conclude that the principal determinants of survival or failure
among southeastern thrifts are, first, their year-end 1984 insolvency resulting
from the increase in interest rates in 1979-81 and initial relatively low levels
of net worth and passbook deposits and, second, credit losses. The interest-
rate-induced losses were disproportionately borne by larger thrifts that appear
to have grown before 1982 by expanding beyond their local market areas,
perhaps due to the competitive conditions they faced. We do not know
whether this expansion was induced by or resulted in low levels of net worth
relative to assets, but these relatively low capital ratios provided them with an
insufficient buffer to absorb the interest-rate-induced losses. Following 1984,
interest-rate decreases resulted in gains to many insolvent thrifts. But invest-
ment in both traditional and nontraditional assets (primarily commercial and375 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
multifamily mortgage loans) on which credit losses were incurred by insol-
vent and solvent thrifts exacerbated the insolvencies and resulted in additional
insolvencies. That credit losses were incurred on both types of assets suggests
that generally poor lending, perhaps exacerbated by unexpected regional
downturns, rather than deregulation of assets granted by the Garn-St Ger-
main Act of 1982, is responsible for thrift failures. Growth permitted by the
deregulation of interest rates or the increase in deposit insurance from
$40,000 to $100,000 per account, does not appear to be responsible for the
southeastern thrifts' insolvency.
10.8 The Annual Cost of Insolvency
To close the paper, we estimate the annual costs that the FSLIC (and, hence,
taxpayers and solvent depositories and their customers) would have incurred
had the 517 southeastern thrifts in operation at year-end 1984 been closed
when they became market-value insolvent. For this exercise, we assume that
our measure of market values provides a sufficient estimate of the costs the
FSLIC would have had to assume. We should point out that this measure is
deficient in several important respects. First, we measure market values in
terms of present values of cash flows for financial assets and liabilities and
book values for other assets and liabilities, as reported in the Thrift Financial
Reports. If these numbers were misreported, intentionally or not, our esti-
mates would be incorrect. The book values of fixed assets (such as buildings
and equipment) probably do not equal their market values; however, these
amounts are relatively small and are likely to understate market values be-
cause they are not adjusted for inflation. Second, our reduction in loan values
to account for expected nonrepayment losses—the amount of delinquen-
cies—is a crude metric. It is not clear, though, whether this over- or under-
states expected losses. Third, the costs do not include losses due to the dete-
rioration of assets that are taken from the private sector into a government
agency. These costs are higher for losses due to defaulted mortgages than to
interest-rate increases because property acquired from defaulted mortgages
often deteriorates in value when it is managed by government agents rather
than property owners. Outstanding and current commercial real estate loans
also tend to lose value after a thrift is taken over by a conservator or govern-
ment agency because of their practice of calling the loans and refusing to
extend additional credit. Finally, we do not include loss due to fraud that was
not discovered until after a thrift was closed. Hence, the costs incurred by the
FSLIC (now the FDIC and RTC [Resolution Trust Corporation]) are likely to
exceed the numbers generated by our market-value model.
Table 10.16 and figure 10.1 show the losses the FSLIC would have incurred
had market-value insolvent thrifts been closed plus the negative market values
of the thrifts that were closed in each year 1984 through 1988. These amounts
then are put on comparable basis for each year. We calculated these costs first376 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
Table 10.16 Ex Post Annual Closure Costs (in $ millions), 1984-1988




Insolvents in operation at year-end
1986 closures not 1984 insolvent
b
Total through 1986
1987 closures not 1984 insolvent"
Total through 1987
1988 closures not 1984 insolvent"
Total through 1988
1985:
Closed in 1985 (NW 1984)"
Insolvents in operation at year-end
Total 1985
1987 closures not 1985 insolvent"
Total through 1987
1988 closures not 1985 insolvent"
Total through 1988
1986:
Closed in 1986 (NW 1985)"
1985 closures plus interest of 6.45%
Total closures through 1986
Insolvents in operation at year-end
Total 1986
1988 closures not 1986 insolvent"
Total through 1988
1987:
Closed in 1987 (NW 1986)"
Prior closures plus interest of 6.77%
Total closures through 1987
Insolvents in operation at year-end
Total 1987
1988:
Closed in 1988 (NW 1987)"
Prior closures plus interest of 7.65%
Total closures through 1988














































1 Previous year's cost compounded (earned forward) at one-year Treasury bill rate.
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Fig. 10.1 Cost of resolution — current year and carryforward amounts had
resolution been accomplished in previous year
by summing the negative market-value net worth of thrifts operating at year-
end. For 1984 this is $3,920 million.
4
1 By year-end 1985, this amount (had it
been incurred) would be equal to $4,250 million ($3,920 million plus interest
at the Treasury bill rate of 8.42 percent). In fact, the 1984 insolvents that were
not closed partially recovered and had market-value net worth of —$2,109
million. To this amount we add $150 million, the negative net worth of the
1984 insolvents that failed in 1985 (and hence were not operating at year-end)
plus interest. (On the assumption that these thrifts failed at mid-year, on aver-
age, we added interest for six months at the U.S. Treasury bill rate.) Thus, the
amount that the FSLIC would have incurred by year-end 1985 had it closed
all insolvent thrifts is $2,259 million. The amount is less than the comparable
1984 amount of $4,250 million because of the decline in interest rates.
A walk through the 1986 calculations is necessary to illustrate an additional
adjustment required to make the numbers comparable at a point in time. As
we did before, the 1984 carryforward to 1985 of $4,250 million is increased
by interest of 6.45 percent to $4,524 million. An additional $3 million is
added to this figure to account for thrifts closed in 1986 that were not insolvent
in 1984, and hence are not included in 1984 amounts but are included in the
1986 amounts to which the 1984 amounts are compared. The 1985 amount of
$2,259 million is carried forward similarly, but there is no additional amount
because all of the thrifts that closed in 1986 were insolvent at year-end 1985.
The negative net worth of insolvents in operation at year-end 1986 is $1,841
million. The thrifts that failed in 1986 had negative net worth at year-end 1985
(plus a half-year's interest) of $588 million. For comparability with the data
from 1984 and 1985, we carried forward the negative net worth of 1985 fail-
ures of $150 million plus interest for a full year of $10 million, a total of $160378 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
million. Thus, the total for closures through 1986 is $748 million, which to-
gether with the negative net worth of thrifts in operation at year-end 1986
equals $2,589 million.
From table 10.16 and figure 10.1, it appears ex post that it was better not to
have closed insolvent thrifts at year-end 1984, but to have waited until year-
end 1985. This assumes, of course, that the authorities knew interest rates
would decline in 1985. However, after 1985 the costs increased. We estimate
that waiting until year-end 1986 would have cost $184 million ($2,589 less
$2,405). Waiting until year-end 1987 would have cost $600 million more than
acting in 1986 and $781 million more than acting in 1985. Waiting until year-
end 1988 would have cost $171 million more than acting in 1987, $735 mil-
lion more than acting in 1986, and $831 million more than acting in 1985.
Figure 10.1 presents the data given in table 10.16 graphically.
An indication of the extent to which the losses presented in table 10.16 are
due to pre-1985 factors (primarily interest-rate risk) is the amount of costs to
the FSLIC (or the taxpayers) of closed and insolvent though still operating
thrifts that are due to thrifts that were insolvent at year-end 1984. These fig-
ures are given in table 10.17 for each year, 1984 through 1988. In 1985 and
1986 almost all the losses (99 and 91 percent) are attributable to thrifts that
were insolvent at year-end 1984. In 1987 the 1984 insolvents are responsible
for 87 percent of the total, and in 1988 for 83 percent of the total. These
percentages understate the effect of the pre-1985 interest-rate-induced losses,
Table 10.17 Amount of Insolvency Cost (in $ millions) of Closed and Operating
Thrifts Due to Thrifts that Were Insolvent at Year-End 1984
1984:
Insolvents in operation at year-end
1985:
Closed in 1985


























































83379 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
because this exercise considers thrifts that were brought close to insolvency
by these losses to have become insolvent later from other causes.
10.9 Conclusions
In this paper we examine data on southeastern thrifts. From reports in other
studies and from impressionistic press reports, we must conclude that our
findings are somewhat at odds with the general perception of the causes and
extent of the thrift debacle. It is reported that most of the losses incurred by
the southwestern thrifts (particularly those in Texas) are due to defaulted com-
mercial real estate loans for which the value of the collateral is much less than
the amounts owed. Allegations of massive fraud also have been made, partic-
ularly with respect to some very large thrifts.
We were unable to determine whether the reports made to the Federal Home
Loan Bank of Atlanta, on which we based our study, were fraudulently pre-
pared. However, we examined opportunistic behavior, defined as thrifts taking
advantage of expanded investment powers and funding risky assets with fed-
erally insured money. In the aggregate, we conclude that insolvent thrifts did
not expand more rapidly than did solvent thrifts and, in general, did not take
greater risks. At the margins, we found some examples that the thrift charter
was taken advantage of and that several of these extreme cases proved to be
the most costly in terms of resolution. But the fact that this behavior was not
characteristic of southeastern thrifts indicates that, in this region at least, ex-
isting controls generally were effective. The principal reason that many thrifts
ultimately were closed, we found, is that they were initially weak and could
not absorb the losses they incurred in the early 1980s due to high interest
rates. Later decreases in interest rates offset some of the losses, but were in-
sufficient in part because they occurred after thrifts had reduced the duration
of their portfolios, principally by shifting into adjustable-rate mortgages. The
remaining deficits could not subsequently be overcome by normally profitable
operations.
In short, we draw the following conclusions:
• The most important cause of the thrift debacle, at least in the Southeast, is
losses incurred as a result of the increase in interest rates in 1979-81.
• Deposit insurance is not a proximate cause of insolvencies and losses, ex-
cept in that it allowed the thrift industry to subject itself to interest-rate risk
while holding low levels of capital. Absent deposit insurance, it is doubtful
that thrifts would so heavily invest funds derived from short-term liabilities
in long-term fixed-interest mortgages.
• Insolvent thrifts did not take advantage of the deregulation of interest rates
and brokered deposits to grow excessively.
• Deregulation of assets (primarily commercial real estate and multifamily
mortgage loans) played a role in the losses incurred by some thrifts, partic-
ularly newly chartered thrifts and those with low (though positive) levels of380 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
net worth at year-end 1984, but this was generally subsumed under
portfolio-wide credit problems. Furthermore, investment in nontraditional
assets tends to reduce exposure to interest-rate risk. Had interest rates gone
up instead of down during the period studied, losses incurred by thrifts with
lower proportions of nontraditional assets might have exceeded the credit
losses experienced by those with relatively more of these assets.
Change in control of thrifts after 1982 had some negative effect on their net
profits (measured on a market-value basis) in only one year (1987). (We do
not have data on change in control before 1983.)
Changes in real estate prices and perhaps in the tax law are inversely asso-
ciated with higher delinquency rates and directly associated with market-
value net profits.
Credit losses (measured by delinquencies) during a year are directly asso-
ciated with failures after 1986, and inversely related to thrifts' market-value
net worth and 1-4 family mortgages at the beginning of the year.
Most of the losses incurred by southeastern thrifts through 1988 are the
result of interest-rate-risk losses and the insolvent but operating thrifts' cost
of funding their negative net worth.
Notes
1. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA)
of 1989 transformed the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Fund (FSLIC) into the
Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF), and transferred the assets of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF). Both funds
and insolvent S&Ls and banks now are administered by the FDIC. Premiums on de-
posits for S&Ls increased from 20.8 basis points to 23 basis points in 1991-93. Pre-
miums for banks increased from 8.3 basis points to 12 basis points in 1990 and to 15
basis points in 1991.
2. Kane overstates the negative net worth, as he deducts his estimate of the interest-
rate-caused decrease in mortgage values from book net worth, which does not include
unbooked intangible assets, such as charter value, mortgage-servicing rights, and the
value of core deposits. (The measurement of these assets is described below.) Kane's
estimate of 1983 aggregate net worth is negative $73 billion.
3. As is explained next, RAP net worth is greater than GAAP net worth.
4. See Barth and Bradley (1989, table 3) for details.
5. See Benston (1985, 14) for details.
6. See Benston (1985, 84-85) for details.
7. Thrifts with tangible capital of at least 6 percent could hold direct investments
and "equity risk investments" (land loans and nonresidential construction loans with
loan-to-value ratios over 80 percent) equal to three times tangible capital. Thrifts that
met regulatory capital requirements but with less than 6 percent tangible capital could
hold these assets in amounts not exceeding the greater of 3 percent of assets or two-
and-one-half times the thrift's tangible capital. Thrifts not meeting regulatory capital
requirements were prohibited from holding such assets without approval from federal
regulators. Also, additional capital equal to 10 percent of the assets must be held.381 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
8. The description of the hypotheses should be read with the caveat, ceteris paribus,
assumed.
9. There actually are not tangible accounting principles. This commonly used term
refers to GAAP net worth less intangible assets, primarily goodwill, whether pur-
chased in an arm's length market transaction or recorded as a result of a supervisory
merger.
10. See Benston and Kaufman (1990) for citations to works on which this conclu-
sion is based.
11. The IRS application of the QTL should not be confused with the regulatory
application of the Competitive Equality and Banking Act (CEBA) of 1985, which
required regulators to enforce a QTL but which had not been implemented before it
was superceded by the FIRREA QTL.
12. See Horvitz (1989) for a very good descriptive account of the failures of Texas
banks and S&Ls.
13. It is possible, though, that the solvent S&Ls held much more diversified port-
folios, and hence avoided losses resulting from local economic declines.
14. Casual observers claim that the removal of interest-rate ceilings increased costs
to depository institutions which resulted in their incurring losses that led to failures. It
is true that deposit interest-rate ceilings can, in the short run, result in transfers of
wealth from savers with relatively interest-rate-inelastic savings supply functions to
S&Ls and banks with locational advantages. However, the ceilings induced the devel-
opment and promotion of alternatives (most notably MMMFs), which also benefited
from computer developments that lowered costs. Consequently, had deposit-ceiling
rates not been removed, S&Ls would have suffered greater losses from disintermedia-
tion or increased borrowing from unregulated sources (such as jumbo CDs, which were
exempt from the Regulation Q ceiling).
15. See Flannery (1989) for a model that explicitly includes these costs.
16. "Regulation of Direct Investments by Insured Institutions," 51 Fed. Reg.
32925.
17. See Barth, Benston, and Wiest (1990) for an explication and critique of FIR-
REA.
18. See, for example, Pizzo, Flicker, and Muolo (1989), Pilzer (1989), and a series
of articles in the Houston Post claiming that the CIA and the Mafia were involved in
S&L failures.
19. An FDIC summary of bank failures between 1934 and 1958 concluded: "In
approximately one-fourth of the banks, defalcation or losses attributable to other finan-
cial irregularities by officers or employees appear to have been the primary cause of
failure. Such irregularities have been responsible for most of the cases since World
War II" (FDIC 1958, 29). Benston (1973) analyzed the 56 bank failures that occurred
from January 1958 through April 1971. He reports that "most of the reasons for bank
failures were fraud, defalcation and similar irregularities on the part of bank officers
and, occasionally, lesser employees. Inept or poor management, which was adjudged
responsible for from a quarter to a half of bank failures before the Great Depression,
. . . has been a very small cause of bank failures in recent years" (pp. 39-40). The
Comptroller of the Currency (1988) published an evaluation of 171 national bank fail-
ures from 1979 through 1987, and compared these to 38 healthy and 51 rehabilitated
banks. This study found that "insider abuse . . . was a significant factor leading to
failure in 35 percent of the failed banks. About a quarter of the banks with significant
insider abuse also had significant problems involving material fraud" (p. 9). However,
the principal problems identified were overly aggressive, incompetent management
and weak boards of directors.
20. Also see Garcia (1988, table 4) for a comparison of GAAP-solvent and
-insolvent thrifts as of 30 September 1986.
21. The preceding brief review of studies necessarily obscures some possibly im-382 G. J. Benston/M. Carhill/B. Olasov
portant anomalies revealed in those studies, and this summary suffers even more from
compression. Hence, it should be read with caution.
22. As of year-end 1988, only seven of the thrifts in our study held more than 1.0
percent of their assets in junk bonds, and none held more than 1.6 percent. We do not
know whether these junk bonds were held in subsidiaries (in which event they would
be valued at market) or as investment securities (in which event we would discount
their cash flows at the agency rate). Discounting at the agency rate results in an over-
statement of about 28 percent for a 10-year security, which would overstate assets at
the thrift with 1.6 percent in junk bonds by no more than 45 basis points.
23. The ratio of the change in asset value to net worth is not a useful measure
because many of the net worth balances are very small and negative, giving rise to very
large ratios and ambiguous signs.
24. Delinquencies (which are available only for aggregate mortgage and nonmort-
gage loan portfolios) were allocated among the four kinds of mortgages in proportion
to their market values. Because delinquencies in 1984 are relatively small, this crude
allocation method probably makes little difference, particularly for the averages, al-
though it might have a significant effect on individual thrifts.
25. Consumer loans' book values were assumed to equal their market values due to
their heterogeneity and short duration.
26. The servicing spread on a thrift's own mortgages is already included in the net
cash flow attributed to those mortgages.
27. Further reductions in negative RAP net worth are recorded as negative percent-
ages.
28. Data separating first and second mortgages, construction and other loans, fixed-
and adjustable-rate mortgages were not reported in 1982.
29. Real estate held for investment is not included because it amounted to less than
one-half of 1 percent of the assets at almost all southeastern thrifts. We inadvertently
did not include brokered deposits and other than passbook deposits in this table; these
liabilities are included in the other tables.
30. The approximately 150 thrifts that joined the fourth district either as de novos
or the Maryland thrifts that joined the FSLIC are not included.
31. The year-end 1984 number excludes thrifts that ceased independent operations
after 1984. One of these thrifts failed; we did not record the market values of thrifts
that ceased operations for other reasons.
32. Congressional testimony by former FHLBB Chairman Danny Wall indicates
that the targeting of smaller thrifts for closure was a consequence of the FSLIC's in-
ability to resolve large institutions.
33. We failed to record brokered deposits and some other data for table 10.5, which
was created early in the project.
34. The numbers decline over time as some thrifts failed or voluntarily merged.
35. The median market value percentages in 1987 and 1988 are —7.5 and —6.8.
The large mean values are due primarily to two thrifts.
36. Because GAP1 is an incomplete measure of duration, the coefficients estimated
do not provide a sufficient measure of the magnitudes of the relationship between
interest-rate risk and the independent variables specified.
37. The regulators calculated this gap number and, after March 1987, encouraged
thrifts to minimize interest-rate risk through the use of capital credits.
38. The Financial Accounting Standards Board's Statement 91, which became ef-
fective after 15 December 1987, limits lenders' ability to record up-front fees in excess
of associated expenses as current income.
39. Eight thrifts had to be dropped from the regressions because their locations were
not on the data tapes.
40. The change in sample size as thrifts are closed or merge may affect the compar-
ison of the annual coefficients estimated.383 The Failure and Survival of Thrifts
41. This is less than the $8,078 million in losses incurred by the southeastern thrifts;
the balance was absorbed by net worth.
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